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This is a comprehensive survey of the decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Florida that construed the bill of rights contained
in article I of the state constitution during 1990. It supplements
this Review's 1989 Survey of Florida Law, which examined the
article I cases released by the court during the decade past.1 Con-
tinuing the same format and case selection criteria,2 the following
1. See Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: A Ten-year Retrospective on the
State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REV. 693 (1990). That project provides clear indica-
tions that the court is engaged in producing an active body of state constitutional juris-
prudence. To briefly abstract its principal findings, the project concluded that: The
court's decisions create a hierarchical order of rights in article I, with the order depen-
dent solely upon the particular standard chosen by the court to measure the justifica-
tion for the state's encroachment; article I rights are not absolute, despite rhetoric to
the contrary; those rights eclipsed the protection against government interference af-
forded by their federal analogues on five occasions during the decade; litigants should
exploit the textual differences between state and federal provisions, thereby promoting
constitutional imperatives that are unique to Florida; and the court has promoted the
independence of the state constitution on several occasions when it eschewed relevant
federal precedent.
2. What follows is a section-by-section summary of the cases that addressed arti-
cle I during 1990. This survey accepts the premise that each opinion citing to the state
bill of rights, whether by principled analysis or passing reference, uniquely contributes
to the development of the Florida Constitution. In profile, the opinion must confirm
that the state constitution was relied upon by the court, addressed by a lower court, or
advanced by a litigant in support of a claim. Conversely, an opinion that generically
refers to equal protection, double jeopardy, and the like, cannot be said to directly add
to the body of state constitutional law. Several recent cases support this position. In
them, the court specifically declined to distinguish the nature of the state and federal
protections, very likely because the claimants sought no particular relief under the
1050 [Vol. 15
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work marks, for the moment, the contours of Florida's evolving
constitutional landscape.
A. INTRODUCTION
The bill of rights is the constitutional pedigree of personal free-
doms. The integrity of the pedigree is only as sound as the barriers it
establishes as protection from governmental excess. Conflict between
the state sovereign and its constituents occurs inevitably when the state
seeks to limit the exercise of personal freedom in the name of the com-
mon good, or wields its power in disregard of constitutional safeguards.
A challenging array of personal rights issues tested the limits of
the state constitution this year. Among them are those that asked
whether the state can:
- authorize a disinherited daughter to avoid her deceased mother's
devise to charity;
- prohibit candidates for statewide offices from accepting campaign
contributions during legislative sessions;
• tax the retail sales of magazines while exempting newspapers;
" enter judgment against a delinquent obligor of child support pay-
ments without allowing the obligor an opportunity to be heard in
court;
- refuse with impunity for two years to comply with an order di-
recting the state to restore wrongfully confiscated and withheld
property to the owner;
- search the carry-on luggage of boarded bus passengers without a
Florida Constitution. See White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So. 2d 886, 888 n.2 (Fla. 1990)
(due process); Wemett v. State, 567 So. 2d 882, 884 n.2 (Fla. 1990) (due process);
State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 316 n.5 (1990) (per curiam) (right to silence).
There is one exception to these case selection criteria. Occasionally, the court cites
to a prior constitutional decision as precedent, without mentioning that the holding has
constitutional significance. The line of cases beginning with State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d
481 (Fla. 1984), offers several illustrations. Cases of that ilk are included to the extent
research successfully identified them.
The five district courts of appeal also contribute to the shaping of constitutional
parameters, and their decisions oftentimes have statewide import. See Stanfill v. State,
384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980) (state constitutional decisions of the district courts
"represent the law of Florida unless and until overruled by the supreme court"); Wei-
man v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985) (absent conflicting precedent of its
district court or the supreme court, a trial court is obliged to follow state constitutional
decisions of other district courts). Time limits alone prevented review of district court
cases in this survey.
1991] 1051
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whisper of suspicion of wrongdoing;
- execute roadside stops of law-abiding motorists merely because
they satisfied an officer's self-styled drug courier profile;
- provide constitutionally effective legal representation when the de-
fendant's state-paid assistant public defender is also a special dep-
uty sheriff;
• relegate citrus growers, whose crops the state destroyed in a citrus
canker eradication program, to an administrative rather than a ju-
dicial determination of damages;
• sanction the seller of allegedly obscene material that the buyer
has a constitutionally protected right to possess; and
• deny a person the right to refuse unwanted medical intervention,
without which death would certainly follow.
Article I cases occasionally spring from emotionally-charged socie-
tal disputes, which are fired by the cultural passions of a diverse citi-
zenry. Once reduced to legal claims, those cases often produce frac-
tured opinions that express doctrinal positions no less impassioned. The
opinions in 1990 crystallized numerous driving principles at work be-
hind the positions advocated by the court's membership. For instance,
the justices on occasion displayed an ambitious aspiration to expand the
scope of protection afforded by the constitutional imperatives of article
I. Other times, a majority returned to the safe harbor of precedent and
narrow construction to deny protection. Some opinions clearly at-
tempted to reach a proper accommodation between the competing in-
terests of the governed and those who govern. Others sought to acheive
a just result, without regard to accommodation. Some turned deferen-
tially upon the court's perception of its own role as a coordinate branch
of government. Others cast the judiciary into the role of guardian of
human dignity when another branch defaulted by failing to provide ad-
equate protection. And there were cases that made apparent the ongo-
ing tension between law, as a dynamic, evolutionary process, and law,
as an interdiction comprised of prohibitory rules. To be sure, the hold-
ings of the court's 1990 cases are of no greater interest and importance
than the collegial and doctrinal forces that produced them.
B. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
1. Political Power
All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation
herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair
[Vol. 151052
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others retained by the people. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
2. Basic Rights
Article I, section 2 makes three separate declarations. The first
expresses the central constitutional concept that the state must deal
with similar persons in a similar manner. The second declares that per-
sons have inalienable rights, and specifically enumerates many of those
rights. The third protects all basic rights of natural persons from depri-
vation, especially on account of race, religion, or physical handicap.
a. Equal Protection Clause
"All natural persons are equal before the law ... " FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2.
In Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic,3 the court
considered a will executed by Lorraine Romans that intentionally lim-
ited the inheritance of her daughter, Lorraine Zrillic, to several boxes
of antique dishes and figurines, and left the remainder of the estate to
Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children. Romans died approximately
two-and-one-half months after executing her will. Zrillic sought to
avoid the devise to Shriners Hospitals in circuit court, relying upon
Florida's version of a "mortmain" statute, a statute that essentially en-
abled a lineal descendent to avoid a charitable devise made within six
months of the testator's death." The circuit court declared the statute
unconstitutional, and the district court reversed that decision.
On review, the Supreme Court of Florida first decided that Zrillic
had standing under the mortmain statute to avoid her mother's devise
to Shriners Hospitals, and then measured the statute against two sepa-
rate clauses within article I, section 2--the equal protection clause, and
the inalienable rights clause. Regarding the first clause, five justices
agreed that Florida Statutes section 732.803(1) violated state and fed-
3. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J,, Shaw, and Ko-
gan, JJ, concurred. Justice Grimes concurred in result. Justice McDonald concurred in
result, and dissented in part, with an opinion in which Justice Overton concurred).
4. FLA. STAT. § 732.803 (1985).
5. Zrillic v. Estate of Romans, 535 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
1991] 1053
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eral equal protection guarantees.' To survive equal protection analysis,
the scheme "must appear to be based at a minimum on a rational dis-
tinction having a just and reasonable relation to a legitimate state ob-
jective."' 7 The statutory scheme here created a class of testators who
die within six months of executing a charitable devise. The court said
that there exists no rational basis for considering differently devises ex-
ecuted six months or more before death, from those executed less than
six months before death. Moreover, the class cannot be said to advance
the statutory aim, for it may operate to uphold charitable devises made
hastily, without adequate deliberation, albeit outside the six month
limit, and may void those devises made without undue influence.8
Three other cases touched upon Florida's equal protection guaran-
tee. The petitioners in the first case, Amendments to Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar-il-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Administra-
tion-2.065 (Legal Aid),9 were fifty-eight members of The Florida Bar
who requested the court to exercise its rule-making power to create a
mandatory pro bono program for the state's practicing lawyers. The
justices declined for the moment to take action on the rules proposed
by the petitioners, pending receipt of a special committee's report on
the subject, but did reach agreement on an interim statement of princi-
ple. Unanimously, the court held: "[E]very . . . member of The Flor-
ida Bar has an obligation to represent the poor when called upon by the
courts . . . Pro bono is a part of a lawyer's public responsibility as an




Petitioners asserted that mandatory pro bono legal services were
compelled by the state equal protection clause, as well as other article I
sections." The justices never reached the constitutional claims. Instead,
the decision is clearly pegged upon the professional obligation under-
taken in the lawyer's oath,' 2 and imposed by common law anteced-
6. FLA. STAT. § 732.803(1) (1985). On this point, Justice Grimes concurred with
the four-member majority. Shriners Hospitals, 563 So. 2d at 71 (Grimes, J., concur-
ring in result).
7. Id. at 69 (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 70-71.
9. 573 So. 2d 800 (1990) (unanimous) (Overton, J., author).
10. Id. at 806.
11. They also contended that mandatory pro bono legal services were required by
article I, sections 9 (due process clause) and 21 (access to courts). Id.
12. The oath states, in part, that "'I will never reject, from ary consideration
personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed .... ' " Id. at 803 (quot-
ing Rules Relating to Ethics Governing Bench and Bar, 145 Fla. 763, 797 (1941) (em-
1054 [Vol. 15
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ents.' 3 Thus, a lawyer's duty to provide pro bono legal services does not
rest upon any express constitutional entitlement of the poor. The
court's avoidance of the constitutional claims may be explained by the
strong likelihood that it chose the more prudential course of resolving
the cause on non-constitutional grounds. 4
White v. Dugger15 dealt with a habeas petitioner's equal protection
claim that the state obtained the indictment against him in a funda-
mentally flawed manner. The stated basis for his argument was that
the indictment against him was returned by a grand jury comprised of
twenty-three jurors, and that the presence of persons during grand jury
deliberations that exceeded the statutory limit of eighteen raised a con-
stitutional violation. The court rejected the claim as meritless. 16
Finally, Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of
America, Inc.' 7 considered a 'statute that taxed the retail sales of
magazines, while exempting from taxation the retail sales of newspa-
pers."s Various magazine publishers charged that the statute violated
the Speech and Press Clauses of the first amendment, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the state constitu-
tional counterparts. The court never reached the equal protection
claim, but instead resolved the case in favor of the publishers on first
amendment grounds, very likely because there existed clear first
amendment precedent. Magazine Publishers is more fully discussed be-
low, under article I, section 4.
b. Inalienable Rights and Deprivation Clauses
All natural persons. . . have inalienable rights, among which are
the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness,
phasis deleted)).
13. The opinion emphasized that "'one who is allowed the privilege to practice
law accepts a professional obligation to defend the poor.'" Id. at 804 (quoting In Inter-
est of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis deleted)), and added that lawyers
are essential to our common law adversarial system. Id.
14. See Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1976).
15. 565 So. 2d 700 (1990) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 703 (citing Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311, 1313 n.2 (1990)).
17. 565 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Ehrlich, C.J., author, Overton,
Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring. McDonald, J., did not partici-
pate.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-904 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1990).
18. FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(i) (Supp. 1988) (imposing tax of six percent on retail
magazine sales); FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(w) (Supp. 1988) (exempting newspapers).
1991] 1055
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to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect
property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and
possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may
be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of
any right because of race, religion or physical handicap. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 2.
Shriners Hospitals, introduced in the preceding section, made two
significant contributions to the state's constitutional jurisprudence.
First, it elevated the right of persons to dispose of property by will from
legislative creation to constitutional dimension. At issue was the scope
of protection afforded by the inalienable rights clause, in light of the
mortmain statute's restriction of certain devises to charity. The clause
expressly protects the right of natural persons "to acquire, possess and
protect property." To ascertain the meaning of that right, the majority
of four justices turned to a principle of constitutional construction that
requires a "common sense reading of the plain and ordinary meaning
of the language." '19 Resorting to dictionary definitions, the justices in-
terpreted the right to "possess" property as meaning "to have, hold,
own, or control 'anything which may be the subject of property, for
one's own use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the proprietor of a
qualified right in it.' "20 They determined that the right to "acquire,
possess and protect property" necessarily includes the incidents of prop-
erty ownership,21 which, in turn, includes the "'right to transmit'"
property to others.22 The mortmain statute directly restrained that
right.
A second contribution is apparent from the court's reliance upon a
principle of constitutional construction that permits it "to carry out the
19. Id. at 67 (citation omitted). Shriners Hospitals is consistent with Florida's
legal tradition of ascertaining intent of the legislature and constitutional adopters by
resort to a plain meaning of the text. For other recent illustrations, see In re Order on
Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561
So. 2d 1130, 1137 (Fla. 1990); State v. Dodd, 556 So. 2d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 1990).
20. Shriners Hospitals, 563 So. 2d at 67 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1046-47 (5th ed. 1979)).
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (5th ed. 1979) (.mphasis omit-
ted)). Article I, section 2 permits the legislature to regulate or prohibit property inheri-
tance and possession by a narrowly limited class-aliens ineligible for citizenship. The
court also reasoned that the framers must have intended that persons outside that class,
including testators, ought to "be free from unreasonable legislative restraint." Id.
[Vol. 151056
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intent of the framers as applied to the context of our times."23 Histori-
cally, courts have distinguished property rights from testamentary
rights. The former were grounded in natural law, and incorporated into
the common law of England. The latter were foreign to the common
law, and were creatures of statute, originally intended to retain for the
monarchs the power of testamentary disposition in their struggle for
power with the organized church.24 The failure of modern-day courts to
question the basis for the distinction only served to blindly perpetuate
it. Finding that those "long-abandoned feudal notions of property"
were now "inapplicable" in Florida, the majority reasoned that the
adopters necessarily had rejected blind adherence to the old English
distinction, and in its place elevated testamentary disposition to consti-
tutional stature as an article I, section 2 property right.25
However, property rights are not absolute, and may yield to valid
exercises of the state's police power. But here, the statutory limit on
charitable devises was not "reasonably necessary" to accomplish the
state's aim of protecting a decedent's spouse or lineal descendants from
disinheritance. That protection formerly was said to avert undue influ-
ence by charitable organizations, or the peculiar susceptibility to influ-
ence by testators facing impending death.26 Fatally, the mortmain stat-
ute enabled a lineal descendent having no contact with a testator to
realize a windfall if a charitable devise were avoided, and enabled art-
ful will drafters to deprive a spouse or lineal descendent of standing to
contest the devise altogether.
Three justices would have upheld the mortmain statute because its
23. Id. (emphasis added). More recent case law indicates that a majority of the
court is committed to viewing article I, section 2 property protections in light of pre-
vailing social and economic conditions. See Harris v. Martin Regency, Ltd., 16 Fla. L.
Weekly s98 (Fla. Jan. 17, 1991) (Barkett, J., author. McDonald, and Kogan, JJ., and
Ehrlich, Senior Justice, concurred. Shaw, C.J., Overton, and Grimes, JJ., dissented.).
24. Id. at 67-68 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 68. For another recent instance of the court's rejecting outmoded us-
age, see Warren v. State, 572 So. 2d 1376 (1991). Warren struck down on grounds of
vaguefiess an anti-prostitution law that proscribed the keeping of a house of 'ill fame.'
The court effectively receded from prior case law upholding the law, writing: "While
the general population might have understood the meaning of 'ill fame' a century ago,
the lack of definition in the statutes, jury instructions, and cases is fatal to its continued
validity. Since the legislature first adopted the "ill-fame" statute, both our society and
our language have changed." Id. at 1377.
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earlier version survived constitutional scrutiny.2 8 Previously, the court
rejected claims that the predecessor statute denied the testator and leg-
atees the right to receive, enjoy, and dispose of property without due
process, and denied them equal protection by unfairly limiting their
right to acquire and dispose of property. 29 Shriners Hospitals illus-
trates the majority's willingness to favor article I rights over unjustified
state regulation, even though it requires the court to expressly overturn
a line of opposing case law.
One other case, In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor
Trailer Truck, Altered VIN 243340M,30 has importance for personal
property rights protected under article I, section 2. The justices held
that the owners of a truck were entitled to seek damages for loss of use
under the implied constitutional remedy of inverse condemnation. The
owner's right arose when the state wrongfully seized the truck, and
wrongfully detained it for a period of two years after the trial court
ordered the state to restore the truck to the owner. This case is more
fully discussed below, under article I, section 9.
3. Religious Freedom
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or
prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious free-
dom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals,
peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivi-
sion or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public rreasury
directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious de-
nomination or in aid of any sectarian institution. FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 3.
28. Id. at 71 (Grimes, J., concurring in result); id. (McDonald, J, concurring in
result, dissenting in part. Overton, J., concurring). Justice McDonald added that the
legislature was well within its prerogatives when it sought to protect "the widow and
children from improvident gifts made to their neglect by the testator." Id. at 72 (cita-
tion omitted). "Surely one would have to say that, had the testator, in her last few
days, succumbed to a television evangelist's call to be with the Lord by delivering her
property to his church and thus leave unprotected a physically handicapped child, a
rational basis for the statute would exist." Id.
29. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S.
666 (1944).
30. 569 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (the mandate did not issue until
March 13, 1991, therefore this opinion was prematurely published. Check subsequent
case history for the citation of the official opinion).
1058 [Vol. 15
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No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
4. Freedom of Speech and Press
Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for def-
amation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged
as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the
party shall be acquitted or exonerated. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
In State v. Dodd,3 1 the court considered whether Florida's Cam-
paign Financing Act3 2 may constitutionally prohibit a candidate for the
1990 Republican nomination for state agriculture commissioner from
accepting or soliciting campaign contributions during a regular or spe-
cial legislative session. Candidate Dodd argued that the act violated his
free speech and associational rights, and a clear majority of the court
agreed.33
The plurality wrote that independent campaign expenditures in
support of a political candidate are said to lie "'at the core of our
electoral process and the First Amendment freedoms,' "s' in particular,
those relating to speech and association. Governmental restrictions of
those freedoms are "particularly grave" 35 when they prevent political
candidates "'from amassing the resources for effective advocacy.' "3
Here, the act effectively cut off all campaign financing during any
meeting of the legislature. That burden is particularly onerous because
Florida law imposes no limit on the number of legislative sessions that
might be convened.
31. 561 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1990) (plurality) (Kogan, J., author. Barkett and
Grimes, JJ., concurred. Overton, J., concurred in a separate opinion. Ehrlich, C.J., con-
curred in result only in an opinion in which McDonald, J., concurred. McDonald, J.,
concurred in result with an opinion. Shaw, J., did not participate.).
32. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(8) (1989).
33. Adding to the three justices who signed onto the lead opinion, Justice Over-
ton wrote separately that he "fully agree[d] with the majority .... " Dodd, 561 So.
2d at 267 (Overton, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 264 (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct.
1391, 1396 (1990)).
35. Id. at 264.
36. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
1991] 1059
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Because the act implicated "weighty" free speech and associa-
tional rights protected under the state37 and federal constitutions, with
an intrusion said to be "particularly grave," the act's restrictions must
meet the compelling state interest test.8 The plurality said there is no
doubt that the act promotes a compelling state interest,39 however, the
act failed to advance its goals through the least intrusive means. In-
deed, the act was a "drastic, overbroad curtailment" of speech and as-
sociational rights.40 For instance, the act applied without exception to
all office-seekers, yet, an incumbent cabinet officer, a position sought by
Dodd, only marginally affects the legislative process; and others, such
as judges, have absolutely no role in that process. Moreover, corrupt
campaign practices may occur as easily during the legislative session as
during any other time. 1 The legislature's effort to remove the appear-
ance of corruption from the campaign podium, though laudably moti-
vated, simply went too far.42
In separate opinions, two justices wrote that the statute suffered
from unconstitutional overbreadth,' 3 and another would hold the stat-
ute facially unconstitutional because its sweeping application to all
candidates was not the least restrictive means of achieving the state's
interest.4
37. In addition to the speech protections assured under article I, section 4, the
court relied upon the equally availing associational rights protection under article I,
section 5.
38. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264.
39. Id. at 265 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Politi-
cal Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)) (acknowledging that the "only legiti-
mate and compelling governmental interests" are the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption) (emphasis omitted). The state argued that Florida politicians
suffered a "crisis of confidence" with the voters, which the act was speclfically targeted
to improve. Id. at 266.
40. Id. at 267.
41. Id. at 265-66.
42. Id. at 267. The plurality elaborated:
[F]ew rights are more basic to the American tradition than the ability of
people to work for political reform through grassroots or personal
campaigning. The raising of money from private sources is a crucial com-
ponent of this right. In its commendable effort to stop the appearance of
corruption caused by well-heeled special interests, the Campaign Financ-
ing Act imposes too heavy a hand on the innocent.
Id.
43. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 268 (Overton, J., concurring); id. (McDonald, J., con-
curring in result).
44. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring in result only. McDonald, J., concurring).
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Two other cases were decided on' federal first amendment grounds,
with passing reference to article I, section 4. In one, Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Morejon,45 the court determined that a news journal-
ist enjoyed no qualified privilege under the federal first amendment to
refuse to disclose information learned on a newsgathering mission as an
eyewitness to a police arrest. The defendant issued a subpoena duces
tecum to the reporter to appear for a discovery deposition. Asserting a
reporter's qualified privilege against disclosing information or docu-
ments obtained in connection with newsgathering activities, the re-
porter moved the trial court to quash the subpoena. The trial court
denied the motion and ordered the reporter to appear. That decision
was affirmed by the district court and approved by the Supreme Court
of Florida. 4
Noting that the Florida Legislature had not enacted a "shield"
law or statutory reporter's privilege, the court explained that any re-
porter's privilege must be based upon the first amendment and article I,
section 4.47 Turning to the leading first amendment decision in this
area, Branzburg v. Hayes,"' the court ruled that in Florida "there is no
privilege, qualified, limited, or otherwise, which protects journalists
from testifying as to their eyewitness observations of a relevant event in
45. 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Overton,
Shaw, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring. Barkett, J., concurring specially).
46. The rationale for the qualified journalist privilege under the first amendment
has been broadly expressed as follows: "'The concept of freedom of the press as guar-
anteed by the First Amendment is the keystone of our constitutional democracy and is
broad enough to include virtually all activities for the press to fulfill its First Amend-
ment functions.'" DiResta & Fee, Unanswered Questions Regarding the Journalist's
Privilege in Florida, 64 FLA. BAR J. 26 (1990) (quoting Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.
Supp. 1299, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1975)). The district court explained that the underlying
rationale for protecting confidential news sources does not apply to most non-confiden-
tial sources of information. "Unlike confidential news sources which are likely to dry up
if disclosed, non-confidential news sources and like evidence seem, for the most part,
unlikely to disappear if journalists are required to testify concerning the same in a
subsequent court proceeding. . . ." Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morejon, 529 So.
2d 1204, 1207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, "the ability of the journalist to
gather and report on the witnessed event is not substantially threatened .... "' Id. at
1208.
47. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579 n.1.
48. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (plurality) (acknowledging that the states were free to
construe their own laws to recognize a reporters' privilege, whether qualified or abso-
lute, the plurality decided that reporters have no qualified privilege under the first
amendment to refuse to respond to subpoenas issued by grand juries, acting in good
faith, in criminal investigations).
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a subsequent court proceeding.149 Because the journalist could point to
no privilege, the court found it "unnecessary" to apply a balancing
test.50 Moreover, the court rejected the newspaper's claim ':hat the first
amendment privilege should apply unqualifiedly, and that compelling
testimony might chill the newsgathering process.51 Morejon treats the
eyewitness news journalist like all other citizen eyewitnesses, although
it left unanswered whether the journalist could successfully assert a
privilege against disclosure of eyewitness information if the source of
his or her eyewitness information is confidential.52
In another case, various magazine publishers challenged the con-
stitutionality of a state statute that imposed a sales tax on the retail
sale of magazines, while exempting the retail sale of newspapers.5"
Some publishers in Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of
America, Inc.54 argued that the statute violated the Speech and Press
Clauses of the first amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and the state counterparts.
The court did not address the state constitutional claims, and de-
cided the issue entirely on first amendment grounds. The first amend-
ment poses no absolute bar against state regulation of the press. For
instance, the state can legitimately subject the press to "generally ap-
plicable economic regulation[s]." 5 However, a scheme like Florida's
sales tax on magazines singles out an individual press entity, which
poses a danger of abuse by the state, thereby implicating first amend-
ment protections.56
49. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 580 (emphasis added). Earlier decisions had upheld
the right of a journalist to protect his or her confidential sources of information. Trib-
une Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951
(Fla. 1976).
50. On that point, there is dispute among the justices. See Morijon, 561 So. 2d
at 582 (Barkett, J., concurring specially) (arguing that decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Florida consistently apply a balancing test
when, as here, first amendment interests are implicated).
51. Id. at 580. The justices aligned Florida with other state courts that declined
to adopt an absolute journalist privilege. Id. at 581 (citations omitted).
52. See DiResta & Fee, supra note 46, at 32.
53. FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(i) (Supp. 1988) (imposing tax of six percent on retail
magazine sales); FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(w) (Supp. 1988) (exempting newspapers).
54. 565 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Ehrlich, C.J., author. Overton,
Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring), petition for cert. filed, No 90-904
(U.S. Dec. 10, 1990).
55. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987).
56. Magazine Publishers, 565 So. 2d at 1305-06 (citing Arkansas Writers' Pro-
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To justify a differential tax that implicates the first amendment,
the state must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Here, the tax assert-
edly advanced the public interest of promoting those publishers en-
gaged in the dissemination of news while it was still new.57 Concluding
that the state's interest clearly was not compelling (and likely not even
rational), the court determined that the state failed to meet its burden,
and consequently the statutory scheme could not stand.58 Having so
concluded, the court struck the exemption granted to newspapers and
allowed the statute to otherwise survive.5 9
Typical of the court's speech and press decisions Dodd, Morejon,
and Magazine Publishers are firmly rooted in federal first amendment
precedent. The occasional, if only passing, references to article I, sec-
tion 4 suggest that the court is disinclined to craft a decision indepen-
dent of federal case law based on the facts at issue in those cases or the
arguments of counsel. Even passing references to the state constitution
indicate, however, that litigants and jurists view the cases as represent-
ing equally important, but not necessarily identical, state constitutional
markers.
5. Right to Assemble
The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct
their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 5.
State v. Dodd60 was the only case to cite article I, section 5. Dodd
was presented in the preceding section, and demonstrates a factual con-
text where the freedom of speech and the freedom to associate are co-
extensive protections.
6. Right to Work
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
ject, 481 U.S. at 227).
57. Id. at 1308.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1310-11.
60. 561 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1990).
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labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a la-
bor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or
abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 6.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
7. Military Power
The military power shall be subordinate to the civil. FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 7.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
8. Right to Bear Arms
The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of them-
selves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be in-
fringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated
by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period. Of
note, the legislature proposed an amendment to article I, section 8, that
imposed a three-day waiting period between the purchase and delivery
of any handgun. 61 The voters adopted the legislative proposal during
the general election of November, 1990.
61. The amendment added three subsections to the existing section:
(b) There shall be a mandatory period of three days, excluding weekends
and legal holidays, between the purchase and delivery at retail of any
handgun. For the purposes of this section, "purchase" means the transfer
of money or other valuable consideration to the retailer, and "handgun"
means a firearm capable of being carried and used by one hand, such as a
pistol or revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit as prescribed in
Florida law shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.
(c) The legislature shall enact legislation implementing subsection (b) of
this section, effective no later than December 31, 1991, which shall provide
that anyone violating the provisions of subsection (b) shall be guilty of a
felony.
(d) This restriction shall not apply to a trade-in of another handgun.
FLA. S.J.R. 43 (1990).
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Florida's due process section combines three discrete categories of
rights. The first category creates interests commonly understood to en-
joy due process protections-the guarantees of life, liberty, and prop-
erty. The due process section also lumps together two other categories
that generally are regarded as protections independent of due pro-
cess-the protection against double jeopardy, and the protection
against self-incrimination.
a. Life, Liberty, or Property
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. . . . FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
The article I, section 9 cases decided in 1990 addressed the safe-
guards afforded to persons whose liberty or property rights the state
impinged, either by legislation or by action of its agents. Typically,
challenges to state action arise in a variety of contexts, and the year's
cases proved to be no exception. The court reviewed, on state due pro-
cess grounds, state procedures that involved enforcement of child sup-
port judgments, administrative permitting procedures, use of eviden-
tiary devices to facilitate the trial of defendants in criminal cases, and
procedures of particular importance in the prosecution of and sentenc-
ing for capital crimes. Finally, the court considered a constitutional
claim for damages by owners whose property the state wrongfully
seized and confiscated. Those cases are treated in turn.
To sharpen the teeth of the state's child support enforcement laws,
the Florida legislature declared in section 61.14(5)(a) and (b) that an
unpaid support payment that became final after July 1, 1987, automat-
ically became a final judgment by operation of law once the clerk of
the circuit court notified the obligor.62 Two district court panels inter-
preted the statute as directing the clerk to enter judgment without
hearing, without an opportunity for the obligor to present defenses, and
without opportunity for the trial court to alter unpaid installments
when warranted. Each panel struck the statute as a violation of various
provisions of the state constitution. 63 Those decisions were consolidated
62. FLA. STAT. § 61.14(5)(a), (b) (1987).
63. State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski, 541 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989); and Attorney General v. D'Agosto, 541 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991] 1065
17
Hawkins: Florida Constitutional Law: 1990 Survey of the State Bill of Righ
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
for review, and quashed in State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski.64
The court couched the "critical question" as whether the law re-
quires the clerk of court to enter judgment without opportunity for the
obligor to present a defense before a judge.6 5 To answer that question,
the court relied upon guiding principles of statutory construction that
required it "'if reasonably possible . . to adopt a reasonable interpre-
tation ... '66 and to "'avoid declaring a statute unconstitutional if
such statute can be fairly construed in a constitutional manner.' "67
The court avoided declaring section 61.14(5)(a) and (b) unconsti-
tutional by reading into it a requirement that the obligor was entitled
to an opportunity to be heard. State and federal due process required
that the section "should be interpreted" to allow a hearing before entry
of a final judgment, provided the obligor timely responds to the clerk's
notice. That notice should advise the obligor to respond by a date cer-
tain, failing which a default judgment will be entered. The hearing
should be held by a judicial officer, before whom the obligor may pre-
sent equitable defenses. 8 Several reasons support the judicial gloss:
Child support enforcement is a major governmental concern which the
statute advances; all branches of government have a shared interest in
the maintenance and support of children; federal legislation requires
states to follow certain procedures toward this end; and Florida has
long supported effective child support collection procedure. 69
In another setting, a unanimous court in Ridgewood Properties,
Inc. v. Department of Community Affairs"0 held that the Secretary of
the Department of Community Affairs may not testify at an adminis-
trative hearing as the sole witness to establish a material fact, and then
pass upon his own evidence by reviewing the hearing officer's proposed
findings and legal conclusions. Here, the Department notified Ridge-
1989). In particular, the district courts determined that section 61.14(5) violated arti-
cle I, sections 9 (due process) and 21 (access to courts), and article II, section 3 (sepa-
ration of powers) of the state constitution.
64. 562 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1990) (Overton, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., McDonald,
Shaw, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring. Kogan, J., concurred in result only.).
65. Id. at 674.
66. Id. at 677 (quoting Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training
Comm'n, 531 So. 2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. 1988)).
67. Id. (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 678-79.
69. Stanjeski, 562 So. 2d at 677-78.
70. 562 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1990) (Grimes, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J.. Overton, Mc-
Donald, Shaw, Barkett, and Kogan, JJ., concurring.).
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wood that it was required to obtain approval for its office park develop-
ment as a development of regional impact. Ridgewood contested that
decision in an administrative hearing, at which the secretary testified as
an expert that Ridgewood held no vested development rights under the
Department's policy that would exempt it from compliance. The hear-
ing officer so found, and the Department, over the secretary's signature,
issued a final order against Ridgewood. The justices held, however, that
the secretary violated Ridgewood's state and federal due process rights
by acting as prosecutor at an administrative hearing, testifying as the
Department's sole witness, and "[m]ost significantly" by passing on his
own evidence. 1 The opinion does not distinguish the state and federal
rights.
In criminal prosecutions, due process requires the state to prove
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is axiomatic
that this burden remains with the state, and may not be shifted onto
the defendant. State v. Cohen 2 considered the limits of burden shifting
in the context of a purported affirmative defense created in the witness
tampering statute. The statute included a subsection that provided:
"[I]t is an affirmative defense. . . that the conduct consisted solely of
lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to en-
courage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully."73
The justices saw through the transparency of the statutory lan-
guage. An affirmative defense "is any defense that assumes the com-
plaint or charges to be correct but raises other facts that, if true, would
establish a valid excuse or justification or a right to engage in the con-
duct in question. ' 74 In effect, an affirmative defense concedes the of-
fense. This section, though labeled an affirmative defense, actually re-
quired the defendant to negate an element of the offense with proof
that his or her conduct was lawful. Relying exclusively on article I,
section 9, the court held that the legislature improperly shifted the bur-
den of proving an element of the crime from the state to the
defendant.7 5
71. Id. at 323-24.
72. 568 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., author; Shaw, C.J., Ehrlich, Barkett,
and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Overton, J., dissented in an opinion joined by McDonald,
J., who also dissented with an opinion).
73. FLA. STAT. § 914.22(3) (1985).
74. Cohen, 568 So. 2d at 51.
75. Id. at 52. The court also concluded that section 914.22(3) was illusory be-
cause it shifted to the defendant a burden of proof that is impossible to meet. FLA.
STAT. § 914.22(3) (1985). That section requires the defendant to prove that "the con-
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On vagueness grounds, Cohen struck down another subsection of
the witness tampering statute, which proscribed conduct intended to
"influence" a person's testimony in an official proceeding. 73 Because it
was unclear whether the legislature intended to proscribe conduct
designed to induce either false testimony, truthful testimony, or both,
the section suffered from vagueness, and facially violated article I, sec-
tion 9.7
Cohen departed from federal precedent by construing the state due
process clause to provide a degree of protection greater than that af-
forded under the federal Due Process Clause. One federal district court
upheld the federal analogue against constitutional attack, reasoning
that the elements of the affirmative defense allow a defendant to avoid
criminal liability upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and
do not relieve the government of its burden of proving the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 7
8
Due process protections are also at work in criminal prosecutions
when the state relies at trial upon evidentiary devices, such as presump-
tions and inferences. Construing the federal Due Process Clause, State
v. Rolle7 9 upheld Florida's drunk driving law,80 which permitted the
state to proceed upon the alternative theories of impairment, or unlaw-
ful blood alcohol level. The court said that the law did not impermissi-
bly relieve the state of proving every element of the crime. The court
also sustained the use of the related jury instruction which provided
that evidence of unlawful blood alcohol level "'would be sufficient by
duct consisted solely of lawful conduct." Cohen, 568 So. 2d at 52. Yet, section
914.22(1)(a) proscribes conduct intended "to influence the testimony of any person in
an official proceeding." Id. It is impossible to prove the lawfulness of conduct, on the
one hand, which the legislature declared unlawful, on the other.
76. FLA. STAT. § 914.22(1)(a) (1985).
77. Cohen, 568 So. 2d at 52-53. Two justices would have avoided declaring the
statute unconstitutional. Both agreed that a "reasonable and proper" interpretation was
that the legislature intended to criminalize conduct that intended to induce untruthful,
not truthful, testimony. Id. at 53 (Overton, J., dissenting. McDonald, J., concurring.).
Justice McDonald strictly interpreted the statute as intending to protect witnesses, vic-
tims, and informants from tampering, for whatever reason. Id. (McDonald, J.,
dissenting).
78. Id. at 53-54 (McDonald, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Kalevas, 622
F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
79. 560 So. 2d 1154 (Fla.) (Ehrlich, C.J., author. Overton, McDonald, Shaw,
and Grimes, JJ., concurring. Barkett, J., concurred specially with an opinion in which
Kogan, J., concurred.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 181 (1990).
80. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1) (1985).
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itself" to establish impairment.81
The statute underlying the jury instruction provides that proof of
unlawful blood alcohol "shall be prima facie evidence" of impair-
ment.8" The court let the statute stand because the phrase was com-
monly understood to create an inference that the jury was free to ac-
cept or reject, and thus, the jury was not bound unconstitutionally to
find impairment from evidence of unlawful blood alcohol. Moreover,
the court said, the legislature would have used the term "presumption,"
had it intended to create a presumption.83 Justice Barkett's special con-
currence made an important clarification of Rolle by noting that the
effect of an evidentiary device, not its label, determines its validity
under state and federal due process standards.84
Death-sentenced prisoners frequently assert due process protec-
tions on appeal. The court reached the merits in four such cases, and
unanimously resolved the due process issues. In the first, Randolph v.
State,85 the trial court excused for cause a prospective juror who
"guessed" that she could vote to impose the death penalty in an appro-
priate case. Randolph argued that the state and federal due process
clauses prohibited the court from excusing a juror " 'simply because
[she] voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed con-
scientious or religious scruples against its infliction.' ",, After evaluat-
ing the voir dire colloquy, the court was unable to hold that the trial
81. Rolle, 560 So. 2d 1155 (emphasis in original) (quoting the jury instruction).
82. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(c) (1985).
83. Rolle, 560 So. 2d at 1157; see also Frazier v. State, 559 So. 2d 1121 (Fla.
1990) (applying Rolle).
84. Id. at 1161. (Barkett, J., specially concurring, Kogan, J., concurring). The
special concurrence suggests that several of the court's previous decisions improperly
concluded that the phrase "prima facie evidence" meant inference, rather than pre-
sumption. The opinion is significant for its principled analysis of the operation of infer-
ences and presumptions, and pointedly demonstrates that the profusion of terms led to
a confusing body of law.
Six months later, the court revisited section 316.1934(2)(c) in Wilhelm v. State,
568 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990), and held that a jury instruction virtually identical to that
section violated federal due process by relieving the state of its burden of proof. Five of
the seven justices agreed that "' [p] rima facie' is a technical term without common
meaning for the lay person. Confronted with such a term in the jury instructions, and
provided with no definition, a reasonable juror would be forced to guess at its meaning
." Id. at 3. Rolle and Wilhelm are easily reconciled by noting that the instruction
in Rolle contained no undefined terms, and avoided using "prima facie evidence." Con-
sequently, Rolle never measured the term against due process standards.
85. 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author).
86. Id. at 334 (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986)).
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court abused its discretion. Citing federal precedent to resolve the
claim, the justices explained: "The trial court had the opportunity to
evaluate the demeanor of the prospective juror, and given [the juror's]
equivocal answers, we cannot say that the record evinces [her] clear
ability to set aside her own beliefs 'in deference to the rule of law.' ,,7
In the second case, Scull v. State,88 the trial court held a resen-
tencing hearing on December 28, 1988, only three weeks after the state
supreme court denied rehearing, but before the trial court received the
mandate. Defense counsel returned from Christmas vacation on De-
cember 27, learned of the impending hearing, and asked the prosecutor
to explain the sudden and hurried case activity. He responded that the
trial judge was expected to soon leave his position and did not want to
"dump" the case on his successor.89 Realizing that he had no authority
to conduct that hearing before receipt of the mandate, the trial judge
held a second resentencing hearing on December 30, after receiving the
mandate. On appeal of the judgment reimposing the death sentence,
Scull claimed that the trial court's haste to resentence him violated his
due process rights.90 The justices unanimously agreed.
Article I, section 9, the court wrote, requires that "all proceedings
affecting life, liberty, or property must be conducted according to due
process.""1 In one sense, the term is incapable of precise definition, and
"embodies a fundamental conception of fairness that derives ultimately
from the natural rights of all individuals." 9 In another sense, the term
subsumes certain well-defined rights, among which are fair notice and
reasonable opportunity to be heard. 3 The trial court's haste to conduct
Scull's resentencing proceeding violated those basic rights, in part, be-
cause "[h]aste has no place in a proceeding in which a person may be
sentenced to death." '94 Perhaps equally important to the decision, the
justices agreed that the "appearance of irregularity so permeates these
87. Id. at 337 (quoting Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402. 416 (1987)).
88. 569 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author).
89. Id. at 1252.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citation omitted); compare Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla.
1990) (citing principle, and holding that trial court abused its discretion by striking
motion for post-conviction relief filed by death-sentenced defendant, without first ruling
on contemporaneously-filed motion to admit foreign attorney pro hac vice).
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proceedings as to justify suspicion of unfairness." 9 The court vacated
the sentence of death, and remanded for another sentencing hearing.
In the third capital appeal, Nowitzke v. State,96 the court agreed
with the defendant who charged that the trial court erred in refusing to
order a competency hearing immediately before trial. On the Friday
before the scheduled trial date, the prosecution offered a plea that in-
cluded concurrent life sentences on two murder counts. Defense counsel
conveyed the offer to Nowitzke, who rejected it, stating that he could
not be executed. He explained that he would be "spiritually released on
July 4, 1989 . . .because it was Independence Day and because of the
number of letters in his three names." 97
Defense counsel moved for a competency hearing. The trial court
summarily denied counsel's request because Nowitzke had been pro-
nounced competent to stand trial on his return from a state mental
health facility three months earlier. A unanimous court reversed the
convictions and remanded for another trial. Due process prohibits the
prosecution of a person while he or she is incompetent.98 Even though
competency has once been established, the trial court has a continuing
obligation to order a competency examination, and conduct a hearing
when it "'has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not
mentally competent to proceed.' "9 Here, the importance of a second
competency hearing was indicated by Nowitzke's irrational reasons for
rejecting the state's plea offer, which in turn cast doubt upon his ability
to assist in his defense or understand the proceedings against him.100
White v. Dugger,11 the fourth capital appeal, rejected as meritless
the defendant's claim that a grand jury allegedly consisting of more
than the statutory limit of eighteen violated state and federal due
process.
In the remaining due process case, the owners of a truck that the
state wrongfully confiscated sued to recover damages. In re Forfeiture
of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck, Altered VIN 243340M'0 2
posed the following certified question: "Does a trial court have jurisdic-
tion to order a payment of damages based on the failure of the state
95. Id.
96. 572 So. 2d 1346 (1990) (per curiam) (unanimous).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210).
100. Id. at 646. Nowitzke also appears below, in article I, section 16.
101. 565 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (unanimous on this issue).
102. 569 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 19 0) (per curiam).
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over a two-year period to honor that court's order returning confiscated
property to its owner[?]"'' 3 Unanimous on the point, the: justices an-
swered the question affirmatively. The facts showed thai the Florida
Highway Patrol (FHP) seized a truck in 1983, and prevailed in a later
forfeiture proceeding. The owners appealed that decision. During the
pendency of the appeal, the FHP transferred the truck and title to the
state Department of Transportation, which incurred costs for storage
and improvements.
The owners succeeded in overturning the forfeiture,' after which
the trial court entered an order on July 22, 1986, directing the state to
return the truck to them. One year later, the trial court entered an
amended order, granting the FHP's motion to add the Department as a
necessary party. Thereafter, the owners filed a motion to determine
damages, in which they sought to recover the value of the truck at the
time of seizure, depreciation, loss of use during the period of confisca-
tion, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees. 10 5 On April 11, 1988,
the trial court ordered the Department to return the truck within ten
days. It entered a final order on May 12, 1988, which denied the dam-
ages claim, and again directed the Department to return he truck, al-
though that was not accomplished until July, 1988, two years after the
court entered its initial order. 06
The trial court denied the owners' claim for damages, apparently
concluding that their recourse was through an action separate from the
claim to recover possession of the truck.10 7 The district court reversed
that decision, stating that the owners were entitled to include a dam-
ages claim in the supplemental proceedings incident to their claim for
return of property. "It defies common sense," the panel explained, "to
require [the owner] to initiate independent legal proceedings involving
the same identical parties in order to secure relief that is predicated
upon the failure to comply with the trial court's order directing return
of the property."'' 08
103. Id. at 1275.
104. Hales v. State ex rel. Florida Highway Patrol, 487 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
105. Motion To Determine Damages at 2, In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1274.
106. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1275-76.
107. That course would have been fatal to the owners' cause because the second
suit extended beyond the time permitted by the applicable statute of limitations. An-
swer Brief of Respondents at 3, In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1274
108. In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck Altered VIN
243340M, 546 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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The justices declined to affirm the opinion of the district court, but
approved the result. Turning to the jurisdictional issue, they creatively
interpreted the rules governing civil pleading practice, so that the own-
ers' motion to determine damages could be treated as a counterclaim
by supplemental pleading. In that way, the trial court was empowered
to exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the claim for damages in the
original suit, although it arose after service of pleadings.1 9
Next, the justices rejected the state's argument that damages
claim sounded exclusively in tort, which would have required dismissal
because the doctrine of sovereign immunity shielded the state from tort
liability. Instead, they characterized the suit as "nbthing less than a
[constitutional] claim of inverse condemnation," 110 against which the
statutory doctrine of sovereign immunity posed no bar."' Expressing
uncustomary conviction, the justices wrote that "the Florida Constitu-
tion dictates that a remedy of this type must exist under the facts of
the present case.""' 2 Those circumstances showed unmistakably that
the state deprived the owners of the use of their truck for two years, in
"outright refusal" to return it after the trial court ordered the state to
do so."'3
On remand, the truck owners were entitled to seek damages for
inverse condemnation under article X, section 6(a) of the Florida Con-
109. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1277 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(e)).
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. See, e.g., State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 1 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 1941)
("neither will it be permitted as a plea to defeat the recovery of land or other property
wrongfully taken by the State through its officers and held in the name of the State");
Schick v. Florida Dep't of Agriculture, 504 So. 2d 1318, 1322 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
112. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1277 (emphasis added). Why the constitu-
tion "dictates" such a remedy is not explained in the court's opinion. Probably, the
answer lies in the notion that the constitutional remedy of inverse condemnation is self-
executing in character, see Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-
Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101, 103 n.2 (Fla. 1988); United States v. Clarke,
445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (citation omitted) (construing fifth amendment counterpart),
and that an owner of private property appropriated for public use may compel compen-
sation via that remedy. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 669
(Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979).
113. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1276. The tone of the majority opinion sug-
gests that a court might wield the constitutional remedy of inverse condemnation as if
it were a sanction against a contemnor. With great charity to the state, however, Jus-
tice McDonald explained that the delay in restoring the truck to the owners was the
result of the Department's efforts to protect its expenditures repairing and improving
the vehicle. Id. at 1277 (McDonald, J., concurring. Overton, J., concurring).
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stitution ("takings" clause).11" Those damages include loss of use be-
tween the date of the initial order directing the return of the truck, and
the date when the Department returned the truck. Also, they were enti-
tled to prejudgment interest on that amount, and attorney's fees. 11 5
In re Forfeiture effectively illustrates the interrelationship of sev-
eral state constitutional sections that bond together to protect personal
property rights-article I, section 2 (inalienable rights clause), article
I, section 9 (due process clause), and article X, section 6(a). However,
several aspects of the opinion counsel that its holding will be limited to
the facts. First, the court on its own resorted to inverse condemnation
as a means for affording the owners relief. Indeed, the two district
court opinions that decided this case, and the record itself, are void of
discussion about or pleading asserting a constitutional remedy." 6 The
sole record reference that would give rise even to the barest allegation
of constitutional infringement cannot be said to contemplate an action
in inverse condemnation." 1 The decision is explained by the court's
search for a fair result, no doubt at least partially motivated by its
disdain for the state's contemptuous disregard of the trial court's order
directing the state to restore the forfeited truck to the owners. For that
reason alone, the circumstances should be viewed as "unique,""" and
unlikely to recur.
Second, the majority attempted to distinguish Wheeler v.
Corbin,"9 a case where the state deprived Gailyn Wheeler of the use of
her car for 524 days after a wrongful forfeiture. The majority reasoned
that the police had probable cause, and thus lawfully seized Wheeler's
114. The section provides: "No private property shall be taken except for a pub-
lic purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by de-
posit in the registry of the court and available to the owner." FLA. CoNsr. art. X, §
6(a).
115. Id. at 1277 (McDonald, J., concurring).
116. The theory advanced by the owner was premised on inherent power, and not
on inverse condemnation: "[A] court has the power to enforce its orders and judg-
ments, including ordering the payment of incidental damages for the violation and long
delay in complying with an order to return confiscated property." Answer Brief of Re-
spondents at 4, In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1274.
117. The owners charged that the Florida Highway Patrol violated a valid court
order without lawful cause, and that its actions offended "'due process' and the orderly
process of the court." Answer Brief of Respondents at 6, In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at
1274.
118. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1277 (McDonald, J., concurring).
119. 546 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1989).
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car, whereas the seizure of the truck here was unlawful.
2 0
In re Forfeiture offers precedential value for private property
rights that extends beyond the four corners of the majority opinion.
The opinion plainly holds that the owner of private property may look
to the remedy of inverse condemnation to vindicate temporary, rather
than permanent, interferences by the state with the use of his or her
property. Another of the court's recent opinions impliedly reached that
result,'12' and the two decisions effectively overturned Florida's histori-
cal position that denied damage claims for mere temporary "tak-
ings.' 22 The decisions have the salutary effect of firmly aligning Flor-
120. The majority explained that Wheeler did not claim that the state failed to
honor a court order directing the return of the confiscated car, "nor did Wheeler seek
damages for any period of time after such an order was entered." In re Forfeiture, 569
So. 2d at 1276 (emphasis in original). But those reasons make Wheeler's cause no less
compensable than the owners' claim in the instant case. In each case, there was no
doubt that the property belonged to the challenging party. More to the point, the cases
are easily distinguished by looking to the validity of the state's conduct in the first
instance. The majority added that Wheeler does not control because it dealt with an
impoundment based on probable cause, whereas the instant case relates to "an outright
refusal of the state to return seized property to its lawful owner after ordered to do so
by a court of competent jurisdiction." Id.
121. Joint Ventures, Inc., v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990)
(striking state statute under state and federal "takings" clauses because it allows the
Department, without compensation, to impose a development moratorium up to ten
years on vacant land located within area reserved for highway expansion). Compare
Wheeler v. Corbin, 546 So. 2d 723, 724 n.2 (Fla. 1989) (declining to reach constitu-
tional "taking" claim because it was not pled, and denying tort-based claim for loss of
use of car during 524 days of impoundment).
122. See, e.g., Morton v. Gardner, 513 So. 2d 725, 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (rejecting claim for damages for loss of use by owner of commercial lobster
fishing boat that the trial court ordered returned after 124-day period of confiscation,
because "[iun Florida, an action for inverse condemnation does not arise from a tempo-
rary 'taking' ") (emphasis in original; citation omitted); Hillsborough County v. Gu-
tierrez, 433 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (flooding of plaintiffs' property
occasioned by ineffective County-enforced plan for disposal of surface drainage water
resulted in only temporary ouster); State, Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Scott, 418 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (four month holdover by depart-
ment beyond expiration of lease term did not permanently deprive landowner of use
and enjoyment of his property); State Dep't of Transp. v. Donahoo, 412 So. 2d 400
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (certain acts by the Department in connection with
interstate road construction, including the mistaken placement of boundary markers,
stacking of equipment, piling of dirt, and placement of drain curb in alleyway running
alongside plaintiff's hotel, did not amount to a permanent invasion that would sustain a
"taking" claim); Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So. 2d 859, 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962) (the record failed to show that the county's dam caused "continuous flood-
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ida with federal precedent. 12 3
In conclusion, the court contributed significantly in 1990 to the
development of a body of state constitutional law independent of fed-
eral standards. Cohen" struck down the witness tampering law be-
cause it impermissibly shifted the burden of proving the elements of the
crime from the state to the defendant in violation of state due process,
although a federal court had previously upheld the federal analogue.
Two other cases relied exclusively on article I, section 9. Scull'2 5 va-
cated a death sentence and remanded for another sentencing hearing
because the trial court's hastily conducted sentencing hearing created
an impermissible appearance of irregularity and suspicion of unfair-
ness. In re Forfeiture2 ' held that state due process dictated that prop-
erty owners were entitled to damages for inverse condemnation after
the state wrongfully confiscated and withheld their property. The re-
maining cases resolved claims on both state and federal due process
grounds, but drew no distinction between the nature of those indepen-
dent sources.
b. Double Jeopardy
No person shall. . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
... .FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Most successive prosect-tion or punishment claims are waged ge-
nerically as double jeopardy claims, and do not expressly rely on article
I, section 9. Of the numerous double jeopardy claims raised in 1990,
only two expressly addressed the state constitution. In one, Fridovich v.
ing [of plaintiff's lands] for a long period of time"); Poe v. State Road Dep't, 127 So.
2d 898, 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (diversion of surface water from its natural
drainage onto plaintiff's property as the result of state highway reconstruction, held to
be only a consequential damage where the drainage results in "recurrent but temporary
flooding").
123. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987) ("'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a land-
owner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for
which the Constitution clearly requires compensation"); United States v. Westinghouse
Electric & Mfg. Co., 39 U.S. 261, 263-65 (1950); United States v. Petty Motor Co.,
327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
124. 568 So. 2d at 52.
125. 569 So. 2d at 1252.
126. 569 So. 2d at 1274.
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State,127 the state prosecuted Fridovich for first-degree murder and
sought to retry him after the district court overturned the conviction
for manslaughter. In a second trial, the state proceeded upon a "Refile
Information for Manslaughter," and obtained a conviction for
manslaughter.'
There was no doubt that state and federal double jeopardy clauses
limit the state on retrial to prosecuting Fridovich for the lesser included
offense of manslaughter. Fridovich argued, however, that the state had
abandoned its prosecution because the refiled information bore a differ-
ent case number than the one appearing on the original indictment.
The court rejected his claim, noting that the new case number was the
product of a clerical error, and that Fridovich was not prejudiced by a
reprosecution of the identical offense for which he was convicted in the
first trial.129
In the other case, State v. Glenn, 30 the defendant sought post-
conviction relief following multiple convictions and sentences for traf-
ficking in, and delivery of cocaine and heroin, all arising out of a single
episode. He charged that Carawan v. State'31 prohibited the state from
obtaining convictions on each offense under the state and federal
double jeopardy clauses. That claim required the court to revisit
Carawan to determine whether Glenn, who was convicted and sen-
tenced at the time when Carawan became final, but who had not then
challenged his conviction and sentence collaterally, could rely upon the
decision as precedent.
Applying the rule of lenity in section 775.021(1), Carawan deter-
mined that the state could not sentence a defendant for both man-
slaughter and aggravated battery when it failed to adequately prove
that those crimes arose from more than a single shotgun blast.132 The
127. 562 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Overton, J., author).
128. Id. at 329.
129. Id. at 330.
130. 558 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Overton,
Shaw, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring. Barkett, J., concurred in result only.).
131. 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987).
132. Carawan was actually a statutory construction case, and never reached the
constitutional concerns of the state double jeopardy clause. However, because the rule
of lenity incorporated into that statute lies at the very heart of double jeopardy guaran-
tees, Carawan and those cases adhering to it are reported here. See State v. Smith, 547
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legislature subsequently amended that statute effective July 1, 1988,133
providing, in part, that offenses were to be viewed as separate if each
required proof of an element not required by the other. In so doing, the
legislature overruled the court's decision prospectively.'3  Carawan,
however, has precedential value for pipeline cases, that is, cases with
direct appeals pending at the time the decision became final.' 3" Glenn
asked whether Carawan was similarly available to persons whose direct
appeals were final, but who had not yet resolved their collateral
appeals.
The court held that Glenn was not entitled to rely upon
Carawan.36 It reasoned that Carawan was no revolutionary change in
the law, but an evolutionary refinement that merely clarified past deci-
sions.1' 7 The policy interest of decisional finality, coupled with the ab-
sence of any manifest injustice brought about by the court's refusal to
revisit his case (post-Carawan laws would permit the state to convict
Glenn separately for his crimes), argued against applying Carawan ret-
roactively to collateral appeals. 38
133. Ch. 88-131, § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws 699, 709 (codified at Fla. Stat. §
775.021(4) (Supp. 1988)).
134. State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 617 (Fla. 1989) (acknowledging that the
legislative amendment effectively overruled Carawan).
135. Rehearing was denied in Carawan on December 10, 1987. Carawan's pipe-
line cases decided this year include: State v. Reddick, 568 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990)
(separate convictions for homicide and shooting into an occupied dwelling have no com-
mon elements, address separate evils, and therefore may properly be imposed);
Porterfield v. State, 567 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1990) (remanding for resentencing where
defendants were convicted and sentenced for sale or delivery of controlled substance
and for possession of that substance); State v. McCray, 561 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990)
(sale and delivery of a drug in a container are two crimes that address the same evil
where the drug paraphernalia is used to facilitate the sale or delivery, and may not give
rise to separate convictions or sentences); Skeens v. State, 556 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1990)
(unanimous) (carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon are separate offenses and may arise out of a single act); Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d
1234 (Fla. 1990) (finding that Carawan imposed no impediment to sentencing defend-
ant for two murders and for shooting into a vehicle occupied by the victims, when
evidence showed that defendant fired three shots).
136. 558 So. 2d at 8.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7-8. Numerous cases followed Glenn this year. See Love v. State, 559
So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1990); State v. Finney, 558 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1990); State, v. Jensen,
557 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1990); State v. Spadaro, 556 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1990); State v.
Etlinger, 556 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1990); State v. Pastor, 556 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1990);
State v. Merckle, 556 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1990).
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No person shall ... be compelled to be a witness against himself.
FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
Only Holton v. State"9 addressed this section during the survey
period. Holton appealed a sentence of death imposed after his convic-
tion of first-degree murder. He argued that the trial court failed to
consider the statutory mitigating circumstance of impaired capacity,
which assertedly applied due to his longstanding drug addiction. The
court disagreed and ruled that the trial court considered the matter, as
evidenced in part by the sentencing order: "The defendant testified that
he was addicted to drugs but still maintained his innocence of these
offenses. This [circumstance] would not apply in view of that sworn
testimony.' 40
The importance of the opinion for article I, section 9 lies with the
court's recognition that a protestation of innocence, which due process
generally prohibits the trial court from using against a defendant in
either guilt phase or penalty phase of a capital trial, may be considered
by the sentencer if it is relevant to mitigation.' 4'
10. Prohibited Laws
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts shall be passed. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
The court struck down two legislative enactments as violations of
article I, section 10. One prohibited awarding attorney's fees under cer-
tain circumstances, and the other prohibited escalation clauses in recre-
ational leases. The first, Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v.
Scherer,'41 involved a medical malpractice action brought by Clara
Scherer for injuries that occurred in June, 1979. She filed her claim on
139. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (unanimous). Holton is also dis-
cussed under article I, section 16, below.
140. Id. at 292.
141. Id.
142. 558 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Overton,
Shaw, and Grimes, JJ., concurring. McDonald, J., dissented in part, but concurred on




Hawkins: Florida Constitutional Law: 1990 Survey of the State Bill of Righ
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
September 20, 1982. Following the jury verdict awarding her damages,
the trial court awarded her an attorney's fee under a law that entitled
the prevailing party to an attorney's fee in medical malpractice ac-
tions., 3 That same law prohibited an attorney's fee for any action filed
before July 1, 1980.'" The district court affirmed the fee award, find-
ing that Scherer's cause of action accrued when she discovered or
should have discovered the existence of malpractice.145
The Supreme Court of Florida vacated the attorney's fee award
and quashed the district court's opinion. It found that the cause of ac-
tion under the attorney's fee statute accrued in June, 1979, when the
negligent act itself occurred, and not when the negligence was discov-
ered. "[D]amages and penalties, including an award of attorney's fees,
for which a physician may be held liable cannot be constitutionally en-
larged after the date of the alleged malpractice . . . [without violating]
state and federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws.146
The prohibition against retrospective application of laws was also
tested when the court allowed enforcement of a rent escalation clause
in condominium recreational leases despite a later-enacted statute that
voided such clauses. The dispute in Association of Golden Glades Con-
dominium Club, Inc. v. Security Management Corp. 47 centered on two
documents, a lease and a declaration of condominium. Cn March 14,
1970, the recreation corporation, as lessor, entered into a long term
lease with the Association, as lessee, which included an escalation
clause allowing for rental adjustments based upon the cost of living
index. On the same date, the developer entered into a declaration of
condominium with the Association, which bound the parties to the
state's condominium act "'as the same may be amended from time to
143. Id. at 413.
144. Fla. Stat. § 768.56 (1981). This section was repealed effective October 1,
1985, Ch. 85-175, § 43, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1225, but continues in force for causes
then pending.
145. Morales v. Scherer, 528 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (reason-
ing that the award of attorney's fees was controlled by the statute of limitation, rather
than section 766.56, and concluding that the jury's determination that the cause of
action accrued after September 20, 1980 should control).
146. Scherer, 558 So. 2d at 414 (agreeing with Morales, 528 So. 2d at 3 (An-
stead, J., dissenting, in part)).
147. 557 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1990) (Overton, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Grimes,
and Kogan, JJ., concurring. McDonald, J., concurred with a separate opinion. Barkett
and Shaw, JJ., concurred in result only.).
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time.' ",148 The recreation corporation was not a party on that docu-
ment. On November 30, 1981, by way of merger, Security Manage-
ment Corporation became the successor in interest to the corporation
on the lease, and to the developer on the declaration of condominium.
This litigation involved Security's suit for rent from the Association
between July, 1980 and January, 1987.149
Between 1975 and 1989, the legislature enacted various laws that
declared void all escalation clauses in residential condominium recrea-
tional leases. 150 Section 718.4015(2), Florida Statutes, in particular,
provided that this policy did not apply "to contracts entered into prior
to June 4, 1975, may not divest the parties of any benefits or obliga-
tions arising from the escalation of fees prior to October 1, 1988, but
only prohibits further escalation of fees pursuant to the escalation
clauses, on or after October 1, 1988. " 151 The court decided that under
the circumstances, Security Management Corporation was entitled to
enforce a rent escalation clause in its lease with the Association.
Several reasons appear to support the court's decision. First, by its
own terms, section 718.4015(2) had no effect on the enforceability of
the contested rent escalation clause because the lease was entered into
before June 4, 1975. Moreover, that section could not be applied retro-
actively, even if the legislature so intended, because to do so would
violate article I, section 10, and the corresponding federal protection
against ex post facto laws.152 Second, the decision was controlled by
precedent.153 In summary, a subsequent merger binds the lessor to the
148. Id. at 1352 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 1351-52.
150. Id. at 1352-53 (recountipg the history of this legislation).
151. FLA. STAT. § 718.4015(2) (Supp. 1988).
152. Id. at 1354 (citing Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976) (dictum)).
Emphasizing the point, Justice McDonald wrote that "[n]o matter how hard the legis-
lature may try, it cannot affect the terms of a contract" in existence before the enact-
ment. Id. at 1355 (McDonald, J., concurring). But see Pomponio v. Claridge of Pom-
pano Condominium, Inc., 378 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1979) (reh'g denied) (looking to the
"actual effect" of a statute on the contractual right, and applying balancing test to
weigh the competing interests); United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Department
of Insurance, 453 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1984) ("minimal" impairment outweighed by rea-
sonable state action); Hawkins, supra note 1, at 767-71 (demonstrating that the protec-
tions of article I, section 10 are not absolute, and have yielded to acts of the legislature
under certain circumstances).
153. Association of Golden Glades, 557 So. 2d at 1355 (citing Cove Club Inves-
tors, Ltd. v. Sandalfoot S. One, Inc., 438 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1983)) (successor lessor
under a recreational lease with an escalation clause, not a party on the declaration of
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declaration of condominium"" only when the lessor expressly agrees to
be bound prospectively by amendments to the condominium act,155 or
the lessor and developer are a single. entity.' 56
11. Imprisonment for Debt
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
In this survey period, the court considered whether article I, sec-
tion 11 protects from imprisonment a parent found delinquent in child
support payments. In Gibson v. Bennett, 5 7 an ex-wife sought to enforce
a final judgment from a Virginia court, which awarded child support
arrearages, in a Florida court by invoking its equitable powers, includ-
ing contempt. The justices noted that Florida has long recognized the
use of equitable remedies to enforce foreign support decrees.' 58 More-
over, the legislature has authorized the use of contempt proceedings to
enforce judgments for arrearage as a means of enhancing enforcement
of family support obligations. 59
Gibson argued, however, that enforcement of a "judgment for sup-
port" by contempt violates article I, section 11.160 The court rejected
condominium, held not bound by the declaration).
154. Association of Golden Glades, 557 So. 2d at 1354-55 (citing Cove Club
Investors, Inc., 438 So. 2d at 355); see also Condominium Ass'n of Plaza Towers N.,
Inc. v. Plaza Recreation Development Corp., 557 So. 2d 1356 (Fla 1990) (holding
enforceable, escalation clause in recreation lease entered into before 1975 statute
prohibiting such clauses).
155. Association of Golden Glades, 557 So. 2d at 1354 (citing Century Village,
Inc. v. Wellington, E, F, K, L, H, J, M, & G, Condominium Ass'n, 361 So. 2d 128
(Fla. 1978)).
156. Id. at 1355 n.2.
157. 561 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Shaw, Bar-
kett, and Grimes, JJ. Overton and McDonald, JJ., each concurred specially with sepa-
rate opinions.).
158. See, e.g., Haas v. Haas, 59 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1952); McDuffie v. McDuffie,
155 Fla. 63, 19 So. 2d 511 (1944).
159. FLA. STAT. § 61.17(3) (1989) ("The entry of a judgment for arrearage for
child support, alimony, or attorney's fees and costs does not preclude a subsequent
contempt proceeding ... for failure of the obligor to pay .... ").
160. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 570. More precisely stated, Gibson challenges his ex-
wife's attempt to enforce a judgment of arrearage of child support, as distinct from a
judgment or decree awarding support in the first instance.
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Gibson's claim. The obligation to pay alimony or child support is not a
debt, but rather a personal duty to the ex-spouse or child, as the case
may be, and society.161 Reducing a support decree to a money judg-
ment does not destroy the decree as an obligation to pay support. 62
Nor is the character of the award altered when the obligor relocates to
another state. The purpose remains the same-fulfillment of a continu-
ing moral and legal obligation to support the former spouse or chil-
dren. 63 So important are these obligations, that a judgment for support
arrearage may be enforced by contempt even after a child reaches
majority.16 4
Justices Overton and McDonald wrote separately165 to argue that
the decision required the court to recede from Lamm v. Chapman, 66
which held that "the acceptance of public assistance for the support of
a dependent child vests in the [Florida Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services] the authority to proceed with all remedies availa-
ble to the child's custodian.1' 61 7 In so holding, the court approved the
use of contempt, as well as other remedies, to enforce judgments for
support, and thereby rejected the claim that the obligation to pay child
support or alimony is a debt for which a delinquent obligor cannot be
imprisoned under article I, section 11. The two justices asserted that
Larnm was premised upon the election of remedies doctrine, which ob-
ligates a party to adhere to a remedy, once chosen. In particular,
Lanm stated that contempt would not be available to enforce a decree
that awarded child support once arrearages were reduced to judg-
ment. 6 8 That is, the aggrieved spouse may seek to secure a money
judgment for the delinquent alimony in a court of law, or alternatively
seek enforcement of the original decree in a court of equity, 69 but con-
tempt is unavailable to enforce the latter. Although the distinction be-
tween a judgment of arrearage and a decree awarding child support is
"technical," and "important in deciding whether contempt lies" under
161. Id..
162. Id. at 572.
163. Id. at 569 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 572.
165. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 572 (Overton, J., concurring specially); id. at 573
(McDonald, J., concurring specially).
166. 413 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1982).
167. Id. at 753 (emphasis in original).
168. Id.
169. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 574 (McDonald, J., specially concurring) (citing
Haas v. Haas, 59 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1952)).
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the election of remedies doctrine, Justice McDonald wrote that the doc-
trine has no further utility and should not impede enforcement in the
child support and alimony context. 170
12. Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
against the unreasonable interception of private communications
by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued
except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, the person or per-
sons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be inter-
cepted, and the nature of the evidence to be obtained. This right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of
this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or
information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Frequently referred to as the "conformity amendment," the cur-
rent version of article I, section 12 took effect on January 1, 1983. Its
principal aim is to assure that Florida courts construe that section iden-
tical to decisions of the United States Supreme Court that interpreted
its fourth amendment counterpart. 17 The section makes two principle
textual contributions beyond the protections secured by the federal ver-
sion. It incorporates an exclusionary rule as a part of Florida's organic
law, whereas the federal exclusionary rule is a product of judicial con-
struction, and merely procedural in nature.7 2 In addition to a great
170. Id. at 573.
171. This was not always the case, for the court construed the pre-1983 article I,
section 12 version independent of the fourth amendment. The body of decisional law
developed under that version has continuing currency in many instances. See Hawkins,
supra note 1, at 773-75 (identifying cases decided during the three-year period 1980-
82, before the conformity amendment took effect).
172. The conformity requirement had two effects upon the exc'tusionary rule of
article I, section 12: First, it stripped the rule of its constitutional stature, by relegating
it to a judicial construct of the United States Supreme Court; and second, it laid vul-
nerable an entire body of state law interpreting that rule.
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deal more descriptive language, the section also expressly affords pro-
tection "against the unreasonable interception of private communica-
tions," whereas the fourth amendment contains no such expression.
Twice in 1990, the court considered whether the conformity
amendment protected persons who became the object of the state's war
on drugs in two very commonplace settings-as passengers on commer-
cial carriers, and as motorists on the open road. In each instance, the
court determined that the state enterprise reached too far into the en-
velope of personal freedom, and held the line on unwarranted police
practices.
In Bostick v. State,173 a four-member majority struck down a
Broward County Sheriff Department's drug interdiction practice, which
consisted of plain-clothed narcotics officers, without a whisper of suspi-
cion of wrongdoing, boarding busses and confronting passengers, re-
questing consent to search their carry-on luggage for contraband. The
"crucial question" was whether "a reasonable person would have be-
lieved he was not free to leave," such that voluntary consent could be
given under the circumstances.1 74 In light of facts that the trial judge
characterized as "very intimidating,"' 75 the majority determined that
Bostick was not free to leave, or "'to disregard the [officers'] questions
and walk away.' ",176 With the protections of article I, section 12 impli-
cated, the state was required to justify its detention of Bostick. It could
not do so. The majority wrote that "[t]here were no articulable facts
and no rational inferences to support the police activity involved
here.' 177 Moreover, the state could not justify the ensuing luggage
173. 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., author, Ehrlich, C.J., Shaw, and
Kogan, JJ., concurring. Justices McDonald and Grimes each filed dissenting opinions
in which the other, and Justice Overton concurred.), cert. granted, No. 89-1717 (U.S.
Oct. 9, 1990). The court released Bostick on November 30, 1989, and the decision was
addressed in Hawkins, supra note 1, at 781-83. Because the decision became final dur-
ing the survey period, brief mention is made here. A series of bus cases that relied upon
Bostick also became final this year. See McPherson v. State, 566 So. 2d 255 (Fla.
1990); Jones v. State, 559 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1990); Nazario v. State, 554 So. 2d 515
(Fla. 1990); McBride v. State, 554 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1989); Mendez v. State, 554 So.
2d 1161 (Fla. 1989); Shaw v. State, 555 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1989); Avery v. State, 555
So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1989).
174. Id. at 1157 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980)).
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
177. Id. at 1158 (relying upon United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442
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search, for it failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that Bostick freely and voluntarily consented to that search.1 8
Then in State v. Johnson,17 9 five justices concluded that a drug
courier profile developed by Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Vogel to
stop and detain passing motorists violated article I, section 12. Trooper
Vogel stopped Paul Clive Johnson because he matched the self-styled
profile:
(1) the car was driving at 4:15 a.m.; (2) the driver was alone; (3)
the driver was about thirty years of age; (4) the car had out-of-
state tags; (5) the car was of a large model type; (6) the driver was
male; (7) the driver was wearing casual clothes; (8) the driver was
being "overly cautious" by driving at precisely the speed limit; and
(9) the car was driving on a known drug corridor, Interstate 95.10
At roadside, Trooper Vogel searched the trunk of Johnson's car and
discovered marijuana inside. The trooper arrested Johnson and seized
the marijuana, which the trial court later suppressed. The district court
affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence.,8
On review by the Supreme Court of Florida, a five-member major-
ity acknowledged that police officers may exercise discretion to stop an
individual under circumstances indicating a likelihood of wrongdo-
ing.182 It said that a "profile" is permissible "precisely to the degree
that it reasonably describes behavior likely to indicate a crime.' 8 3 The
fourth amendment, in an analogous context, requires a roving border
patrol officer in search of illegal aliens to point to "'specific articulable
facts, together with rational inferences from those facts'" that warrant
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before the officer is justified in mak-
U.S. 873 (1975)).
178. Id. at 1158-59.
179. 561 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., author. Overton, Shaw, Grimes,
and Kogan, JJ., concurring. Ehrlich, C.J., dissented with an opinion, and McDonald,
J., dissented with an opinion in which Ehrlich, C.J. concurred.).
180. Id. at 1140. Trooper Vogel testified that he developed the profile based upon
elements common to thirty arrests he made during a thirteen month period before
Johnson's arrest. That profile differed from the Patrol's own profile, which included the
presence of air shocks on the car, window opaquing, and evidence that the car was
loaded heavily. Id. at 1140-41.
181. State v. Johnson, 516 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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ing a stop.18 4 "At the very least," the justices reasoned, the same stan-
dard applies to "roving stops of state citizens by state police." 18 5
Two justices disputed the majority's conclusion that Trooper Vogel
lacked sufficient justification to conduct a stop. Chief Justice Ehrlich
conceded that several factors relied upon by the trooper were inappro-
priate, but argued that other factors were sufficient to support reasona-
ble suspicion. He viewed reasonable suspicion as "'seen and weighed
not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement.' "186 Justice McDonald argued
that the trooper's accumulation of factors was "reasonable," and "rea-
sonable profile stops of an automobile on a state highway should be
contemplated by users of the highway," whose expectation of privacy is
necessarily diminished due to the fight against Florida's "huge drug
problem." ' 7
The majority responded that an individual's "unusual" conduct,
conduct that sets him or her apart from others, may justify a stop, 88 as
illustrated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Sokolow.8 9 There, agents of the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration became suspicious that Sokolow was engaged in drug traffick-
ing, and stopped him at the Honolulu International Airport, where he
had two day's earlier purchased two round-trip airplane tickets from
Honolulu to Miami. In what it described as "a typical attempt to
smuggle drugs" through an airport, 190 a seven-justice majority deter-
mined that the agents demonstrated sufficient justification to stop Soko-
low. Important to that opinion, Sokolow's arrest was supported by sev-
eral factors of probative significance such as: the agents' "reasonable
ground to believe" that Sokolow used an alias when he purchased the
tickets;- and their knowledge that he paid $2,100 in cash for them.' 9'
That latter factor was "out of the ordinary," especially because Soko-
low made payment from a roll of $20 bills containing nearly twice that
amount of cash. 92 When taken together with other factors known to
184. Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)).
185. Id. (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 1145 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 1146 (McDonald, J., dissenting. Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
188. Id. at 1142 (emphasis in original).
189. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id. at 8-9.
192. Id. at 8.
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agents," 3 the government had a reasonable basis under the fourth
amendment to suspect that Sokolow was transporting illegal drugs.
To satisfy an article I, section 12 infringement, the state must
demonstrate that there exists "a strong and articulable link-a 'ra-
tional inference'-between the sequence of acts observed by the police
and the concealed criminal conduct believed to exist, whether or not
this sequence is described as a 'profile.' "194 Johnson, unlike Sokolow,
contained no record evidence that the defendant behaved unusually. In-
deed, Johnson matched a profile that included an enormous class of
law-abiding travelers. The court noted that the "sole basis" for Trooper
Vogel's decision to stop Johnson was the coincidence of similarities be-
tween Johnson and the trooper's personal profile. Thus, his detention
and arrest upon that basis alone were unjustified.
In an opinion released the same day as Johnson, Creswell v.
State,195 a realigned majority reached an opposite result. The majority
of four justices held that factors in a drug courier profile, when viewed
in light of the officer's experience, may provide an articulable or
founded suspicion that will justify under fourth amendment standards a
brief investigatory detention of a motorist after a legitimate traffic
stop. 96 It distinguished the two cases by noting that Johnson consid-
ered whether a profile could justify a brief investigatory stop, whereas
Cresswell concerned a brief investigatory detention following a lawful
193. Sokolow's original destination was Miami, "a source city' for illicit drugs;
• . .he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Hono-
lulu to Miami takes 20 hours; . . .he appeared nervous during his trip; and ... he
checked none of his luggage." Id. at 3.
194. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1143 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884).
195. 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990) (Ehrlich, C.J., author. Overton, McDonald, and
Grimes, JJ., concurring. Justices Shaw and Kogan dissented with separate opinions in
which Justice Barkett joined).
196. Trooper Vogel stopped Cresswell for "following too closely,' and justified
the roadside detention in the following manner:
Cresswell was very nervous, was driving along a known drug route in a
vehicle with a large trunk, had a Massachusetts driver's license but was
driving a car registered to someone else with Maine license plates and
New York state insurance and inspection stickers, there was a CB radio in
the car, the ignition key was separate from the other keys, and the back
seat contained items normally found in the trunk.
Id. at 483. Trooper Vogel then detained Cresswell to await the arrival of a narcotics
canine unit. The court wrote: "'when viewed together by a trained law enforcement
officer such facts... "'can be combined with permissible deductions. . . to form a
legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that suspicion.'"
Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981)).
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traffic stop. 9 7 Moreover, it regarded the factors in Cresswell "at least
as strong as those approved in Sokolow."' 98
Looking beyond the record facts, Justice Kogan argued in dissent
that the experience of precedent disproved the constitutional validity of
Trooper Vogel's profile. The earlier cases that had considered the
trooper's profile showed that he had applied it "with such extreme in-
consistency as to make it extremely unreliable." 199
13. Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and
without cost. It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never
be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, suspension is
essential to the public safety. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
14. Pretrial Release and Detention
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presump-
tion is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of
municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release
on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasona-
bly protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons,
assure the presence of the accused. at trial, or assure the integrity
of the judicial process, the accused may be detained. FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 14.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
15. Prosecution for Crime; Offenses Committed by Children
(a) No person shall be tried for capital crime without presentment
197. Id. at 482 n.2.
198. Id. at 483. Justice Shaw viewed the facts relied upon by the majority as
vastly different from those in Sokolow; and concluded that the trooper lacked the justi-
fication for detaining Creswell. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting, Barkett, J., concurring).
199. Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting, Barkett, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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or indictment by a grand jury, or for other felony without such
presentment or indictment or an information under oath filed by
the prosecuting officer of the court, except persons on active duty
in the militia when tried by courts martial.
(b) When authorized by law, a child as therein defined may be
charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of
crime and tried without a jury or other requirements applicable to
criminal cases. Any child so charged shall, upon demand made as
provided by law before a trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried in
an appropriate court as a adult. A child found delinquent shall be
disciplined as provided by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15.
A lone dissenting justice in State v. Smith 00 argued that article I,
section 15 should be construed to permit prior inconsistent statements
made by a declarant during a prosecutorial investigation to be intro-
duced at trial. The court relied upon the controlling statute without
reaching the constitutional position advanced by the dissent.
Evidence of an out-of-court prior inconsistent statement is gener-
ally regarded as unreliable, and inadmissible under the hearsay stat-
utes. Florida Statutes section 90.801(2)(a) creates a narrow exception
when the declarant testifies at trial, and has made the prior inconsistent
statement at some "other proceeding." ' 20 ' The exception admits the
statements as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted. In Smith, the prosecutor interrogated a witness, in the presence
of a deputy sheriff and court reporter, about her involvement in a homi-
cide.202 The court was asked to decide whether a prosecutor's investiga-
tion qualified as an "other proceeding" under section 90.801(2)(a).
The court in an earlier case said that the statute required formal-
ity, no less than a deposition, but no more than a hearing,2'3 and that a
police investigative interrogation, even though under oath, does not
qualify as an "other proceeding. ' 20 4 In Smith, the court held that the
section applied equally to a prosecutor's investigation, and ruled the
witness's prior statements inadmissible because the investigation lacked
the requisite "'degree of formality, convention, structure, regularity
200. 573 So. 2d 306, 318 (Fla. 1990) (Overton, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
201. FLA. STAT. § 90.801 (2)(a) (1985).
202. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 313-14.
203. Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So. 2d 74, 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
adopted, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1986).
204. State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1986).
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and replicability of the process in question.' "205
Relying in part on article I, section 15 to dispute the majority's
decision, Justice Overton argued in dissent that the state constitution
gives to an assistant state attorney virtually the same power to charge
that it gives to the grand jury. Because grand jury proceedings have
been held to satisfy the requirements of the statute, Justice Overton
argued that the prosecutor should be no less entitled to rely upon its
provisions.206
16. Rights of Accused and Victims
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand,
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and shall be furnished a copy of the charges, and shall have
the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at
trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both,
and to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the
county where the crime was committed. If the county is not
known, the indictment or information may charge venue in two or
more counties conjunctively and proof that the crime was commit-
ted in that area shall be sufficient; but before pleading the accused
may elect in which of those counties he will be tried. Venue for
prosecution of crimes committed beyond the boundaries of the
state shall be fixed by law.
(b) Victims of crimes or their lawful representatives, including the
next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be
informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all cru-
cial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights
do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 16.
Article I, section 16(a) creates a cluster of rights designed to pro-
tect persons subject to criminal prosecution. Among those rights con-
sidered this year were the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right
of representation, and the right to trial by an impartial jury.
a. Confrontation
The right "to confront at trial adverse witnesses" was one of.sev-
205. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 314 (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 320.
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eral constitutional rights abused by prosecutorial misconduct that re-
sulted in the court's reversal of two murder convictions in Nowitzke v.
State."'7 Through a psychiatrist, the defense established that Nowitzke
was insane at the time of the offenses. On cross-examination, the prose-
cutor asked the psychiatrist whether he had been accused of being a
"hired gun" by another psychiatrist, who was unconnected with the
case. The prosecutor asked the question several more times and but-
tressed the accusation by emphasizing it during closing argument. The
court wrote that the prosecutor's introduction of the opinion was irrele-
vant and misleading on the issue of the psychiatrist's credibility, was
improper impeachment of an expert, and violated the defendant's right
to confront the declarant under the state and federal constitutions. 08
b. Representation
Indigent persons may qualify for the assistance of court-appointed
counsel in both felony trial proceedings and any ensuing appeal. The
appointment of counsel advances the right of the accused "'to be heard
. . . by counsel," assured under article I, section 16. In re Order of the
First District Court of Appeal Regarding Brief Filed in Forrester v.
State"9 addressed the nature and extent of appellate counsel's role in
prosecuting the initial appeal on behalf of an indigent defendant.
Forrester is best understood against the backdrop of the sixth
amendment's requirement that "the accused shall enjoy the right...
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense,"'2 10 and Anders v.
California,211 where the United States Supreme Court stated that
counsel's "bare conclusion" that there was no merit to an appeal
"'[could not] be an adequate substitute for the right to full appellate
review available to all defendants' who may not be able to afford such
an expense. "212 The Court in Anders continued:
The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair pro-
cess can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an advo-
207. 15 Fla. L. Weekly 645 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (unanimous). Nowitzke is
also addressed above, in article I, section 9.
208. Id. at 647.
209. 556 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author.).
210. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (deciding that the sixth
amendment was obligatory on the states through the fourteenth amendment).
211. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
212. Id. at 742-43 (citation omitted).
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cate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae
... . Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous,
after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the
court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, how-
ever be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal.
213
Forrester pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine and mari-
juana that were seized from his automobile without a warrant, and re-
served the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to sup-
press that evidence.214 Forrester's appellate counsel filed an Anders
brief, in which he concluded that an appeal would be frivolous and to-
tally without merit.15 Counsel stated that no good faith argument
could be made in support of the suppression claim.216
The district court ordered counsel to file a supplemental brief on
the suppression issue, and to advocate "'whether, in the context of a
non-consensual, warrantless search, a canine alert, without more, con-
stitutes probable cause.' "217 Counsel appealed that order to the Su-
preme Court of Florida, arguing that it violated article I, section 16
and its federal counterparts by shifting counsel's role from advocate for
the client to amicus curiae for the court, which would infringe upon a
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
The court unanimously rejected that constitutional argument. Ex-
ercising its inherent power, "an appellate court can order supplemental
briefs in any case before it, regardless of the type of brief originally
filed." 218 Anders requires a "complete and careful review of the record"
to support counsel's claim that an appeal would be wholly frivolous. In
so doing, counsel serves the dual aims of effective client representation
and assisting the court in its independent evaluation of the record. 219
Harich v. State220 also addressed the right to effective legal repre-
sentation assured by article I, section 16. Harich argued in a collateral
appeal of his conviction that his assistant public defender's appoint-
ment as a special deputy sheriff created a conflict of interest that vio-
213. Id. at 744.
214. Forrester, 556 So. 2d at 1115.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1115 n.2.
217. Id. at 1116 (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 1117.
219. Id.
220. 573 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (unanimous).
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lated that section. At an evidentiary hearing on the claim, the trial
court found that the sheriffs of three Florida counties issued "special"
or "honorary!' deputy sheriff cards to Harich's trial counsel,221 but that
counsel neither acted nor held himself out as a regular deputy. Not
only did Harich fail to produce any evidence in support of his claim,
but the evidence disproved it. The justices unanimously approved the
findings of the trial court that counsel's status as a special deputy was
widely known to members of the legal community, and easily discover-
able through due diligence. 222 They also rejected Harich's arguments
that counsel's appointment as a deputy sheriff amounted to an actual
conflict, that prejudice must be presumed from that appointment, and
that the allegation of these facts creates a per se constitutional
violation.223
c. Impartiality
The right to "trial by impartial jury" is the most frequently liti-
gated of the cluster of rights created under article I, section 16. Trial
impartiality includes the assurance that a party will not exclude pro-
spective jurors solely because of their membership in a discrete racial
group. In 1984, State v. Nell224 established the standard for determin-
ing whether a party's peremptory challenges were racially motivated,
and thus violated article I, section 16. Briefly stated, the challenging
party must make a timely objection, and demonstrate on the record,
first, that the challenged prospective juror belongs to a distinct racial
group, and second, that there exists a strong likelihood that the other
party exercised a peremptory challenge to remove that juror solely on
account of race.225 If the trial court agrees with the movant, the burden
shifts to the other party to show the existence of valid non-racial rea-
sons for striking the juror.226 State v. Slappy227 later confirmed the
court's commitment to "a vigorously impartial system of selecting
221. Those counties were Volusia County, located in the Seventh Judicial Cir-
cuit, the venue of the trial, and Marion and Lake Counties, located in the adjoining
Fifth Judicial Circuit.
222. Id. at 305.
223. Id.
224. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
225. Id. at 484.
226. Id. at 486-87.
227. 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
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jurors. ' ' 22
After Neil, the court declared that a defendant has standing to
raise an article I, section 16 violation, even though he or she is not of
the same race as the juror peremptorily challenged by the state. How-
ever, it acknowledged that such a defendant may have more difficulty
in making a prima facie showing of racial bias than a defendant who is
of a race different from the challenged juror.229 Reed v. State"0 is the
most recent illustration of the point. Reed, a white man charged with
murdering a white victim, moved for mistrial following the prosecutor's
use of eight of ten peremptory challenges to excuse blacks from the
jury. The trial court found, virtually without any explanation by the
state, that the challenges were not based purely on race. With due re-
gard for the "inherent fairness and color blindness" of trial judges,23 '
the Supreme Court of Florida agreed:
Given the circumstances that both the defendant and the victim
were white and that two black jurors were already seated, we can-
not say that the trial judge abused his discretion in concluding that
the defense had failed to make a prima facie showing that there
was a strong likelihood that the jurors were challenged because of
their race.2 32
Although Reed illustrates the court's deference to the role of the
trial court in assuring trial impartiality under article I, section 16, the
court is unlikely to address the merits of a Neil claim in the absence of
record support. Only by adequately developing the record can trial at-
torneys protect a valid Neil claim, or defend against it, as the case may
be. For example, in Bryant v. State,2 3 the state proffered no reasons to
justify its excusing five blacks during the course of its first seven pe-
remptory challenges, yet the trial court summarily denied defense
counsel's request for a Neil inquiry. Ultimately, six white and six black
jurors were impanelled, but not until the state exercised seven of its
228. Id. at 21. A four-justice majority in Slappy agreed that any doubt about
whether the complaining party met the initial burden under Neil would be resolved in
favor of that party. Id. at 22.
229. Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 1989).
230. 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 230 (1990).
231. Id. at 206.
232. Id.
233. 565 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
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sixteen peremptories to strike blacks."3 4 On appeal, the state argued
that the reasons for the peremptories were race-neutral and not pretex-
tual.2 35 The majority acknowledged that some of the excused jurors'
responses indicated valid basis for challenge, but found the responses of
others impossible to evaluate. Without benefit of an independent evalu-
ation of the state's reasons by the trial court, the supreme court de-
clined to review the bare record.23 6
The absence of record clarity was also central to Floyd v. State.237
Defense counsel timely objected to the prosecutor's attempt to peremp-
torily excuse the last of two black prospective jurors remaining on the
panel. The prosecutor offered a factually erroneous, but race-neutral,
explanation for the peremptory. He said that during voir dire, the juror
had expressed the view that twenty-five years' imprisonment was
enough for Floyd's crime, which suggested a predisposition against im-
posing the death penalty. The trial court denied defense counsel's ob-
jection, conceding that it did not recall the juror's response, but noting
that it was "'on the record.' "1238 In fact, however, the record confirmed
that the excused juror never made such a response.23 9
A five-justice majority rejected Floyd's claim of error because de-
fense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's erroneous explanation,
and thereby failed to preserve the claim for appellate review.
There is no question that the state's explanation was race-neutral,
and if true, would have satisfied the test established in [Neil and
Slappy]. It is uncontroverted, however, that the explanation was
not true . . . .Thus, we must determine the parameters of the trial
court's responsibility to ascertain if the state has satisfied its bur-
den of producing a race-neutral reason for the challenge 40
234. Id. at 1300.
235. Id. at 1301.
236. Id.. Justice McDonald dissented on the Neil issue, declaring that it was
"manifest from the record" the state's exercise of peremptory challenges was not ra-
cially motivated. He believed that record proof of the state's race-neutrality was
demonstrated by the ultimate composition of the jury, which included six black and six
white jurors. Id. at 1303 (McDonald, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
237. 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., Overton, Ehrlich,
Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurred; McDonald, J., dissented with an opinion in which
Barkett, J., concurred).
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The duty of the trial court is to establish record support for the state's
reason, and it may assume the verity of any race-neutral reason if un-
challenged by defense counsel. Had defense counsel disputed the prose-
cutor's reason, the trial court could have easily reviewed the record,
discovered, and then corrected the error.24'
Floyd accomplishes two ends. First, it reiterates the court's com-
mitment to the Neil-Slappy formulation-defense counsel can preserve
a claim for appellate review only by timely objecting when the state
strikes a prospective juror who is a member of a distinct racial group,
and by showing that there exists a strong likelihood of a racially im-
proper motive. The court could have rejected Floyd's Neil claim be-
cause defense counsel failed to clearly satisfy the latter component of
this standard. 42 By assuming that counsel satisfied the threshold, how-
ever, the court was able to address the more vexing problem posed by
an unresolved record conflict. Second, Floyd imposes upon defense
counsel the requirement to object when the state's explanation for its
peremptory challenge lacks record support.
In stark contrast to the record uncertainty in Bryant and Floyd,
the record "clearly support[ed]" the trial court's ruling to summarily
deny defense counsel's Neil objection in Holton v. State.243 The record
showed that one prospective juror peremptorily excused by the prosecu-
tor harbored reservations about capital punishment, and another was
ambivalent toward recommending the death penalty. For those reasons,
defense counsel was unable to demonstrate a "strong likelihood" that
the state excused the two prospective jurors solely because they were,
black.244
When asked to explain his excuse of a third prospective black ju-
ror, the prosecutor stated his belief that the juror might be unsympa-
thetic toward the murder victim, who was a female prostitute. The jus-
tices agreed that "one could reasonably conclude that the prospective
juror could not be sympathetic toward a prostitute. ' 245 Holton is a
straightforward application of Slappy,24' and reconfirms that the
state's peremptory challenge will be sustained on appeal if the record
241. Id. at 1229. Two justices took no issue with the majority's resolution of the
Neil claim, but dissented, arguing that the facts of the murder made the death penalty
inappropriate. Id. at 1233 (McDonald, J., dissenting; Barkett, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 1229 n.4.
243. 573 So. 2d 284 (per curiam) (unanimous).
244. Id. at 287.
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. 522 So. 2d at 22.
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demonstrates that its proffer is both race-neutral and reasonable.
Collateral claimants only unsuccessfully raised Neil issues this
year. Roberts v. State241 rejected an argument on collateral appeal that
the trial court employed an improper Neil standard. The claim was
procedurally barred because appellate counsel failed to raise it on di-
rect appeal.248 However, the court reached the merits of Roberts' claim
for habeas relief, which charged that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the trial court's reliance upon Neil, rather than
the prevailing federal standard. The court held that counsel's failure to
challenge the jury selection was not ineffective assistance because it
amounted to neither defective performance, nor prejudiced the
appeal.2 4 9
Lastly, State v. Griffith250 may be fairly viewed as recognizing
that the right of an accused to a trial by an impartial jury is a coordi-
nate protection with article I, section 22, which provides that the quali-
fications and the number of jurors, no fewer than six, shall be fixed by
law.
17. Excessive Punishments
Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture
of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of
witnesses are forbidden. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Claims of excessive or disproportionate punishment are litigated
247. 568 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
248. Id. at 1258; see also Hill v. Dugger, 556 So. 2d 1385, 1387-88 (Fla. 1990)
(per curiam) (without approving or disapproving the claim that the state violated Hill's
rights by peremptorily excusing black prospective jurors on account of race, the court
simply noted that the trial court denied the latter as procedurally barred because ap-
pellate counsel failed to raise it on direct appeal).
249. Roberts, 568 So. 2d at 1262-68; see also Hill, 556 So. 2d 1385. Hill pro-
vides no glimpse into the allegedly offending colloquy, and it sheds little light onto the
ineffective assistance claim:
Given the state of the law on the Neil issue at the time of this appeal, as
well as the record in this case on the inquiry and reasons given by the
prosecution for the excusal of the prospective jurors, we find that appellate
counsel was not ineffective under the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984)] test.
Hill, 556 So. 2d at 1389.
250. 561 So. 2d 528, 530 n.3 (Fla. 1990). Griffith is discussed more fully under
article I, section 22.
[Vol. 151098
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virtually entirely on federal eighth amendment grounds. It is indeed
unusual to find mention of article I, section 17. For that reason, Judy
Buenoano's last-minute collateral appeal to stay her impending electro-
cution, and in particular Justice Kogan's dissenting opinion, warrant
special mention. In Buenoano v. State,2 51 the court considered Bue-
noano's request for an evidentiary hearing on her claim that her execu-
tion would be "cruel and unusual"25 2 because, she asserted, the electric
chair used by the state prison system would malfunction. Her legal the-
ory seized upon the macabre, grizzly circumstances of Jesse Tafero's
electrocution, which occurred only weeks earlier. The evidence showed
that smoke and twelve-inch flames spurted from Tafero's head immedi-
ately after he received the first jolt of electricity. Tafero was pro-
nounced dead approximately seven minutes later and only after'a third
jolt of electricity was administered.253 Relying upon the strength of an
affidavit from her own expert, Buenoano argued on appeal that a
"'homemade'" electrode caused the chair to malfunction, a condition
which she claimed the Florida Department of Corrections had failed to
remedy.254
A four-justice majority reached the merits of Buenoano's constitu-
tional claim, and found that the record as proffered failed to justify
judicial interference with the Department's function. The majority de-
ferred to the Department as the agency charged with executing con-
demned prisoners, and presumed that the Department properly per-
formed that function. It noted that the Department's own investigation
showed that the "irregularities in Tafero's execution" were the result of
using a synthetic, rather than a natural sponge, which apparently did
not affect the functioning of the electrode. "Death by electrocution,"
the majority concluded, "is not cruel and unusual punishment, and one
malfunction is not sufficient to justify a judicial inquiry into the De-
partment of Corrections' competence. ' 255
251. 565 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (Ehrlich, C.J., Overton, McDon-
ald, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Shaw, J., dissented with an opinion in which Barkett
and Kogan, JJ., concurred; Barkett, J., dissented with an opinion in which Kogan, J.,
concurred; Kogan, J., dissented with an opinion).
252. Id. at 311.
253. Id. at 310-11.
254. Id. at 311. One expert attributed the malfunctioning to the Department's
use of "only a single 'homemade' leg electrode[,] . . . haphazardly constructed from an
old Army boot and other spare parts." Id. at 315 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 311 (citing Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463
(1947)). This conclusion was hotly disputed. Justice Barkett charged that the majority,
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Buenoano decided a federal question, as is evident by the major-
ity's use of eighth amendment phraseology, "cruel and unusual," and
by its reliance upon federal precedent. In marked contrast, article I,
section 17 uses the disjunctive form, "cruel or unusual." Arguably, the
adopters of article I, section 17 intended to create a protection against
barbaric, arbitrary, non-individualized, and disproportionate punish-
ment that is qualitatively different from the eighth amendment protec-
tion. Otherwise, the adopters would have replicated federal phraseology
in this section, as they had in many other article I sections. 56 However,
Buenoano took no occasion to consider the distinction.
Buenoano's importance for state constitutional law is not lost, for
Justice Kogan's dissenting opinion provides a glimpse of the contours of
this right from the viewpoint of one justice. Believing that article I,
section 17 requires "swift and sure punishment," he argued the court
should remand for an evidentiary hearing to establish whether "any
reasonable possibility" existed that the flames observed during Tafero's
execution were the result of faulty electrodes.2 57 If so, the trial court
should stay future executions until the state overhauls the electric
chair, for "any electrical malfunction that results in needless charring
of human flesh or an unnecessarily slow death" violates state and fed-
eral protections.258
by denying Buenoano a hearing, "departs not only from any semblance of due process
but from any process at all . . . [, and adds] a bizarre twist to death penalty jurispru-
dence." Id. at 312 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Two other justices would have remanded
for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 311 (Shaw, J., dissenting); id. at 313 (Kogan, J.,
dissenting) (adding that the Department failed to take "any meaningful step to investi-
gate or correct the possible malfunctioning of the electric chair").
256. Compare People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 640, 493 P.2d 880, 883, 100
Cal. Rptr. 152, 155, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (concluding that the use of the
disjunctive form in article I, section 6 of the Constitution of California--"nor shall
cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted"-was purposeful, and that capital punish-
ment violates the section) (en banc); People v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3c6 797, 808, 647
P.2d 76, 82, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806 (1982) (en banc) (noting that a popular initiative
effectively cancelled the holding of Anderson, and restored the death penalty "'to the
extent permitted by the federal Constitution' ") (citation and emphasis omitted).
257. Buenoano, 565 So. 2d at 315 (Kogan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
258. Id. Several other death row inmates collaterally challenged the Depart-
ment's competence to carry out the death penalty. Relying upon Buenoano, five mem-
bers of the court affirmed the trial courts' summary dismissals. See Hamblen v. State,
565 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1990); White v. State, 565 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam);
Squires v. State, 565 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam). Those opinions report that
the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, held a hearing and found
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the constitutional claim against the De-
[Vol. 151100
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On another subject, there is minority support for the view that
conviction under Florida's RICO statutes,2 59 and the predicate obscen-
ity laws,260 produces the potential of "draconian," unconstitutionally
excessive penalties. That argument appeared in a dissent to Stall v.
State,2 1 and expresses the concern that the state could impose upon a
defendant convicted of showing, selling, distributing, or renting obscene
materials, the same severe maximum penalties intended for organized
criminals, drug smugglers, and contract murders (life imprisonment,
heavy fines, and likely forfeiture of assets) .262
18. Administrative Penalties
No administrative agency shall impose a sentence of imprison-
ment, nor shall it impose any other penalty except as provided by
law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 18.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
19. Costs
No person charged with crime shall be compelled to pay costs
before a judgment of conviction has become final. FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 19.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
partment, id. at 320 (citation omitted), and that there existed no substantial
probability of recurrence of the problems that accompanied Tafero's execution. Ham-
blen, 565 So. 2d at 321 (citation omitted). Ultimately, the Department carried out
subsequent executions without recurrence of those problems.
259. Florida RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) Act, codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. §§ 895.01-.06 (1985).
260. FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (1985).
261. 570 So. 2d 257, 274 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting; Barkett, J.,
concurring).
262. Id. at 527-28; see also Comment, RICO's Forfeiture Provision: A First
Amendment Restraint on Adult Bookstores, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 419, 446-47 (1988)
(concluding that RICO's forfeiture provision amounts to a prior restraint on the distri-
bution of non-obscene materials, which are entitled to first amendment protection, and
suggesting that the government's goal of eradicating organized crime is not sufficiently
compelling to justify total forfeiture of all assets of an adult bookstore).
1991] 1101
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20. Treason
Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against
it, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort, and no
person shall be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open court.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 20.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
21. Access to Courts
The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury,
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 21.
Many litigants during the 1980s challenged statutes that sought to
limit product liability claims by imposing time bars on recovery. One
type of statute, a statute of repose, cuts off a right of action after a
specified time, such as the completion of work or delivery of goods. It
not only bars an accrued action, but also prevents accruad where the
final element essential to the accrual occurs beyond the period estab-
lished by the statute.263 In 1980, Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co. 264 held that the twelve-year statute of repose, which required
that product liability actions must be commenced "within twelve (12)
years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original
purchaser, 265 violated article I, section 21 as applied. The court re-
ceded from Battilla in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,266 and held that the
statute of repose did not violate article I, section 21. The court rea-
soned that manufacturers should not be held perpetually accountable
263. See University of Miami v. Bogorff, No. 74,797 slip op. at 3-4 (Fla. Jan. 18,
1991); Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978); Carr v. Brow-
ard County, 505 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 541 So. 2d 92
(Fla. 1989). Those cases also explain that the statute of repose operates differently
from another time bar to recovery, the statute of limitation. The latter establishes a
time limit within which an action must be commenced, bars enforcement of an accrued
cause of action, and runs from the date the cause of action accrues.
264. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980).
265. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3) (1975).
266. 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
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for injuries caused by their products, and that the legislature could rea-
sonably decide that the risk of liability should not extend beyond a
twelve-year period beginning with the date of a product's sale.167
In 1990, Frazier v. Baker Material Handling Corp.268 decided the
fate of product liability claims that accrued in the window between
Battilla and Pullum. Frazier was injured by a product delivered before
the court issued Battilla. His injury occurred after Battilla, yet within
the twelve-year statute of repose declared unconstitutional by that deci-
sion. Only the four-year statute of limitation posed a time bar to his
claim, and Frazier filed suit within that period. Nonetheless, the trial
court entered summary judgment against him, reasoning that Pullum
reinstated the twelve-year statute of repose, which operated to cut off
his claim. The district court affirmed the trial court.2 69
The Supreme Court of Florida expressed the general rule: "'[A]
decision of a court of last resort which overrules a prior decision is
retrospective as well as prospective in its application unless declared by
the opinion to have prospective effect only.' ,,270 Because Pullum was
silent on the issue of retroactivity, the rule applied to reinstate the stat-
ute of repose, making it binding on Frazier. However, Frazier con-
vinced four justices that his case fell within a well-established exception
to the general rule, which provides that "[a] claimant with a viable
cause of action is entitled to rely on the existing law which provides
that claimant access to the court. 27 1 Thus, a claimant who relies upon
a then-prevailing judicial interpretation of the controlling statute can-
not be penalized by a later decision that leaves the claimant without
relief.272
267. Id. at 659 (adopting Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg Co., 392 So. 2d 874,
874-75 (Fla. 1980) (McDonald, J., dissenting)).
268. 559 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., author; Shaw, Grimes, and Ko-
gan, JJ., concurring; McDonald, J., dissented in an opinion concurred in by Ehrlich,
C.J., and Overton, J.).
269. Frazier v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 540 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989).
270. Frazier, 559 So. 2d at 1092 (quoting Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Mfg.
Co., 515 So. 2d 735, 736 (Fla. 1987)).
271. Id. at 1093 (citing FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21).
272. Id. at 1092 (citations omitted). In dissent, Justice McDonald argued that
the exception relied upon by the majority did not apply. He wrote that Frazier had no
reason to rely on Battilla at the time he filed his claim, because that decision had no
bearing on his case. Battilla simply held the statute of repose unconstitutional as ap-
plied, that is, as applied to suits initiated against a manufacturer more than twelve
years after the date of sale. Id. at 1093 n.1 (McDonald, J., dissenting; Ehrlich, C.J.,
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Turning to the subject of child support enforcement, the justices in
State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski7 3 rejected the finding of two lower
courts that section 61.14(5), Florida Statutes (1987), denied delinquent
obligors access to courts. The statute provided that unpaid support pay-
ments became a final judgment by operation of law after notice by the
clerk of court to the obligor. However, it omitted from its text any
provision that would allow the obligor to challenge the facts upon
which the judgment was based. The court salvaged the statute by "rea-
sonably constru[ing]" it to require a hearing before any such judgment
became final, provided that the obligor timely responded to the clerk's
notice of arrearage.27 4
Another topic of constitutional significance emerged from the
state's exercise of its police power in 1984, when it eradicated a blight
on Florida's valuable citrus industry known as citrus canker. The eradi-
cation program spawned a series of cases by citrus growers who sued in
inverse condemnation to recover damages for property destroyed by the
state. In the first of those cases to reach the court, a five-member ma-
jority held in 1988 that the eradication program was a valid exercise of
the state's police power, and that owners were entitled to full and just
compensation for destroyed "healthy, but suspect" citrus plants.275
Among the cases that followed were three suits consolidated for
relief in Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v.
Bonanno.76 In circuit court, the Department moved to dismiss the
suits, arguing that the act,27 7 which established procedures for citrus
canker claims, deprived the court of jurisdiction. The act created an
administrative hearing process as the "'sole and exclusive remedy' "
and Overton, J., concurring). He added that the two cases were also distinguishable on
their facts-Battilla was injured beyond the twelve-year cut-off, whereas, Frazier was
injured within that period. Thus, the statute did not deny Frazier access to courts by
barring his claim altogether, but merely shortened the time allotted fcr bringing suit.
Id. at 1094.
273. 562 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1990). This case is discussed more fully under article
I, section 9.
274. Id. at 678-79.
275. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers,
Inc., 521 So. 2d 101, 102, 105 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
276. 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam). The court released two other deci-
sions that emerged from challenges to the state's eradication program. Both involved
liability and damages issues. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs. v. Polk,
568 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1990), and Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-
Florida Growers, Inc., 570 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1990).
277. Ch. 89-91, 1989 Fla. Laws 143.
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for owners who opted to accept a schedule of compensation. That
schedule prescribed presumptive values for categories of destroyed cit-
rus plants, and presumed that those values represented full and fair
compensation. The circuit court declared the act unconstitutional, and
denied the Department's motion. The Department then petitioned the
supreme court for a writ of prohibition to restrain the circuit court
from exercising jurisdiction.2 78
The owners responded by arguing, in part, that the act unconstitu-
tionally deprived them of their right of access to courts under article I,
section 21 .279 A four-justice majority disagreed, and prohibited the cir-
cuit court from proceeding further with the suits.
[T]o the extent that the statute could be said to place a limitation
upon access, there is no violation of article I, section 21. In Kluger
v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), this Court held that the legisla-
ture may abolish a common law right of access to the courts if it
provides a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people
to redress for injuries.280
Clearly, the legislature abolished a right of access enjoyed at common
law. By itself that action would have been fatal to the act. However,
the majority concluded that the act survived constitutional scrutiny be-
cause the legislature put in its place a "reasonable alternative" remedy,
by assuring the owners the opportunity for review of the administrative
decision by the First District Court of Appeal. 81
Three justices dissented on this point, arguing that the legislature
impermissibly interfered with the exercise of constitutionally conferred
judicial power.212 In particular, the Administrative Procedures Act 283
278. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d at 27.
279. That theory is grounded in the notion that the trial judge, not an adminis-
trative agency, is the trier of all legal and factual issues in an inverse condemnation
suit, except those relating to damages. See Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d at
104.
280. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d at 30.
281. Id. (Shaw, C.J., Overton, McDonald, and Grimes, JJ., concurring). The
majority added that the act also provided salutary advantages to affected owners. It
conferred some benefits not available in circuit court, permitted the payment of claims
barred by the statute of limitations, and eliminated the obligation that claimants invali-
date releases they signed to obtain partial compensation under the act. Id.
282. Id. at 35 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Barkett and
Kogan, JJ., concurring).
283. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1987).
1991] 1105
57
Hawkins: Florida Constitutional Law: 1990 Survey of the State Bill of Righ
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
insulates the agency from effective judicial review. A court reviewing
an agency's decision under the canker eradication program may not
reweigh the evidence, but may only decide whether there exists on the
record sufficient evidentiary support for the final decision.
Another of Bonanno's constitutional contributions is addressed in
the following section.
22. Trial by Jury
The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain invio-
late. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than
six, shall be fixed by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
The first of two cases to consider this section focused upon the
meaning of the guarantee that the right to a jury trial shall be secure
and inviolate. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v.
Bonanno,s8 4 introduced in the preceding section, considered a claim by
nursery and grove owners that the canker eradication program deprived
them of their right to litigate their inverse condemnation suits before a
court and jury, and impermissibly relegated them to the administrative
process. The majority rejected their claim.
Relying upon principles familiar to this section, the court deter-
mined that the right to jury trial is assured in those cases where the
right was recognized "'at the time Florida's first constitution became
effective in 1845.' ",285 Because there then existed no right to jury trial
in condemnation proceedings, 288 and the right to have a jury determine
damages is a creature of modern statute, the legislature is free to
change or take away that right. Thus, the citrus owners have no consti-
tutionally protected right to prosecute inverse condemnation suits
before a jury.
The second of the two cases focused upon this section's numeric
requirement for jury size. By law, twelve persons are required to try
capital cases, and six persons are required to try all other criminal
284. 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
285. Id. at 28 (quoting In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433,
435 (Fla. 1986)). Actually, Florida adopted its first constitution in 1838, although it
did not become effective until Florida gained admission into the Union in 1845. Dudley
v. Harrison, McCready & Co., 127 Fla. 687, 698, 173 So. 820, 825 (1937).
286. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d at 28 (citing Carter v. State Rd. Dep't, 189 So. 2d
793, 799 (Fla. 1966)).
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cases.281 In State v. Griffith,288 the state waived the death penalty
before jury selection in exchange for an agreement with Griffith's coun-
sel to accept a six-person rather than a twelve-person jury. Describing
the right to a jury trial as "indisputably one of the most basic rights
guaranteed by our constitution," 2 9 the court determined that the
state's waiver of the death penalty in a capital case does not automati-
cally entitle a defendant to trial by a six-person jury.29° However,
where the record indicates that defense counsel discussed the waiver of
the twelve-person jury with the prosecutor and trial court, counsel's
choice to proceed with a six-person jury will be viewed as tactical.
Under those circumstances, there is no need that the record contain the
defendant's personal waiver for the waiver to be effective.29'
23. Right of Privacy
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the
public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided
by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
The right of privacy, or as it is more precisely phrased in the state
constitutional context, "the right to be let alone," expresses the power
of natural persons to define for themselves the boundary of their per-
287. FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (1985); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.270.
288. 561 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Shaw,
Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ, concurring. Overton, J., concurred in result only).
289. Id. at 530.
290. The state claimed that its waiver of the death penalty in a first-degree mur-
der case precluded a defendant from demanding a trial by twelve persons because
death was no longer a possible punishment. One justice accepted this argument. Id. at
531 (Overton, J., concurring in result only). The other members of the court rejected
the claim, agreeing instead that the legislature defines the crime, classifies the crime,
sets the punishment, and prescribes the number of jurors required for trial. A prosecu-
tor has no authority to unilaterally alter those parameters. Id. at 529.
291. Id. at 530; see also, State v. Enriquez, 572 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1990) (no
showing that defendant's waiver, as evinced by stipulation between defense counsel and
prosecutor to trial by six-person jury, was invalid); State v. Rodriguez-Acosta, 561 So.
2d 531 (Fla. 1990); State v. Jones, 561 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1990); State v. Mustelier, 561
So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1990). Cf. State v. Joseph, 561 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1990) (unwilling to
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sonal lives, and imposes a correlative limit upon the state that prevents
its encroachment into that boundary.2"2 To assure that this "indepen-
dent, freestanding, [and] fundamental" right 93 will remain "as strong
as possible," ' 4 the court measures state intrusions under the most ex-
acting standard of review, the compelling state interest test.2 95 Once
the protections of the privacy amendment are implicated, the state may
justify its interference with that right only by showing that interference
was necessary to advance a compelling state interest, and that it ac-
complished the interference by the least intrusive means.
The "right to be let alone" is inherently subjective, and, in its ab-
solute sense, respects a universe of personal choices. That partially ac-
counts for the diversity of definitions found in much of the commentary
on the subject. Grouping the court's privacy decisions into broad cate-
gories representing spheres of personal interest promotes our under-
standing of the concept, and suggests how an asserted interest will fare
under article I, section 23 analysis by facilitating comparison with fac-
tually similar cases.
To accomplish those aims, the decade survey organized the court's
article I, section 23 cases into three general categories of privacy
interests:
disclosural or informational privacy (how, when, and to what ex-
tent a person allows private information to be communicated to
others); traditional search and seizure contexts (the privacy pro-
tected by article I, section 23 that is similarly protected by the
292. The distinction between "right of privacy" and "right to b- let alone" has
significance beyond the obvious turn of the phrase. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 264
(Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting). For one, it respects the framers' intent to set apart
Florida's express constitutional guarantee from the right to privacy implied in the fed-
eral constitution. See Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST. U.L REv. 609, 652-
53 n.268 (1978). Moreover, the "right to be let alone" borrows from an historical con-
cept that reveres privacy as the most valued fundamental right. See Hawkins, supra
note 1, at 827 n.674. Finally, it bears note that the text of a constituticnal section, and
not its title, determines its construction. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(h). For that reason,
courts must look to the text itself, not the caption, to ascertain its meaning.
293. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1985).
294. Id. at 544.
295. The court has uniformly applied this standard in civil cases See, e.g., In re
T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443
So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983); administrative cases, see, e.g., Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548; and
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warrant and reasonableness requirements of article I, section 12
and the fourth amendment); and decisional autonomy or self-deter-
mination (control over one's character, identity, and
associations).298
This survey adheres to that model. Twice in 1990 the court construed
article I, section 23. The two decisions, In re Guardianship of Estelle
M. Browning297 and Stall v. State,298 addressed claims that the state
unjustifiedly interfered with the freedom of personal choice assured
under that section.
Personal dignity, individual autonomy, and the right to make for
oneself decisions affecting matters of purely personal destiny lie at the
heart of the right to be let alone, or as it is also described in this con-
text, the right of self-determination. Persons make decisions of this sort
daily, seldom with interference. Yet, some decisions, such as the diffi-
cult choice made by persons to refuse or discontinue life-sustaining
medical intervention,299 often run head-on into a "regulatory purga-
tory"3 00 that effectively circumscribes personal choice. Browning poign-
antly illustrates the unfortunate consequences of misguided
296. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 831. Functionally, these categories aid the defini-
tional understanding of privacy by focusing on the varied qualities of individual life
that persons seek to reserve for themselves, apart from outside scrutiny. See Stall v.
State, 570 So. 2d 257, 264 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting). Privacy interests derive
from constitutional sources other than article I, section 23, including the search and
seizure, substantive due process, and liberty clauses. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 561 So.
2d 1139, 1143 (Fla. 1990) (unjustified stops of motorists with similarity to drug courier
profile intrude upon privacy rights protected under article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987)
(privacy interests are inherent in the concept of ordered liberty). Compare Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (the right to privacy is founded in the concept of
personal liberty of the fourteenth amendment).
297. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., author; Shaw, C.J., Ehrlich, Grimes,
and Kogan, JJ., concurring; McDonald, J., concurred with an opinion; Overton, J., con-
curred in part and dissented in part with an opinion).
298. 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., author; Shaw, C.J., Overton,
Ehrlich, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Barkett, J. and Kogan, J., each dissented with an
opinion in which the other concurred).
299. Often referred to as "death with dignity" or the "right to die," the term
right of choice more precisely describes the particular decisions made under the rubric
self-determination, whether the decision is either to choose or to refuse a particular
course.
300. Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 11, 1990, at 3B, col. 2.
1991] 1109
61
Hawkins: Florida Constitutional Law: 1990 Survey of the State Bill of Righ
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
regulation. 301
Like many others, Mrs. Browning took care to execute a living
will, an instrument that is essentially a directive to physicians and fam-
ily expressing preferences about the medical course to be followed in
the event she were to face incapacity. Her declaration provided:
If at any time I should have a terminal condition and my attending
physician has determined that there can be no recovery from such
condition and my death is imminent, where the application of life-
sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the
dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or with-
drawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally with only the ad-
ministration of medication or the performance of any medical pro-
cedure deemed necessary to provide me with comfort care or to
alleviate pain.302
Mrs. Browning expressly added that she did not desire to be fed nutri-
tion or hydration, either by gastric tube or intravenously.303
The year following her declaration, Mrs. Browning suffered a mas-
sive stroke that caused major, permanent, and irreversible damage to
her brain, and left her totally unresponsive and unable to communicate.
On the day of her accident, Mrs. Browning was hospitalized, and a
gastrostomy tube was inserted into her stomach. Through it, she re-
ceived food and liquid. The same month, she was transferred to a nurs-
ing home, where a nasogastric tube was inserted after her gastrostomy
tube became dislodged and she encountered numerous unpleasant,
301. Many reported decisions, Browning among them, confirm that patients
often predecease the resolution of legal proceedings initiated on their behalf. See
Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16 n.17.
302. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989). That provision substantially comports with Florida's Life-Prolonging Pro-
cedure Act, Ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Laws 136 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.01.15 (Supp.
1984)).
303. The removal of nutrition or hydration was foreign to the Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act. Although any competent adult could declare a written intent to with-
hold or withdraw "life-prolonging procedures" under specified circumstances, the act
excluded the "provision of sustenance" (food and water) from its definition. FLA. STAT.
§ 765.03(3) (Supp. 1984). For that reason, the issue before the court did not involve
the import of remedial protections afforded under the act, but Mrs. Browning's right of
privacy under the state constitution. Meanwhile, the legislature amended the act to
eliminate the exclusion, now including sustenance within the scope of "life-prolonging
procedures." Ch. 90-223, § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws 1644.
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chronic maladies. 0 4
Several months after Mrs. Browning's relocation to the nursing
home, the circuit court appointed a guardian. Some two years after the
debilitating stroke, the guardian petitioned the circuit court to order
that artificial feeding be discontinued. At a hearing on the guardian's
petition, medical evidence showed that Mrs. Browning was non-coma-
tose, and lived in a persistent vegetative state.30 5 The circuit court
found that Mrs. Browning's death was not imminent,306 a prerequisite
to the withdrawal of medical support under Florida's Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act,3 07 and denied the petition.
The district court affirmed the circuit court, finding, however, that
even though Mrs. Browning had no remedy under the act, she did have
a remedy under article I, section 23.308 It declared that "a remedy
must exist to fulfill Mrs. Browning's constitutional right of privacy,"30 9
and in particular, her right to refuse medical treatment. The district
court panel took the initiative, and proposed a thoughtfully crafted pro-
cedural scheme to give effect to that right.310 It then certified the fol-
304. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 8 n.3; Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261-62.
305. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9; Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261.
306. That finding was premised upon medical opinion testimony that Mrs.
Browning could continue to live for an "indeterminate" time with the feeding tube left
in place. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9. To the mind of the district court panel, and at
least one commentator, this distinction, like others in the act, warrants rethinking. See
Browning, 543 So. 2d at 265 (defining imminent death under conditions where medical
treatment is continued, effectively renders the statute "useless"); Morgan, Florida Law
and Feeding Tubes-The Right of Removal, 17 STETSON, L. REv. 109 (1987) (such a
construction effectively disenfranchises persons whose condition, though not terminal, is
irreversible). As will be seen, the state supreme court rejected the trial court's method
of determining "imminence" for constitutional purposes. See infra at note 338.
307. Ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Laws 136.
308. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261. The district court observed that the case was
presented to the trial court almost exclusively under the Florida Statutes, and that both
the guardian's attorney and the trial court were understandably confused about the
distinction between the procedural requirements for a statutory, versus a constitutional
claim. Id. at 262.
309. Id. at 266.
310. The district court outlined procedures that took into account the selection of
the surrogate (either a guardian or the circuit court in exceptional cases), id. at 270;
the need for an informal forum, preferably without judicial review, id. at 270-71; evi-
dence essential to the decision to forego treatment, including physicians' certificates to
establish the patient's current medical condition, evidence that the patient will not
regain competency, evidence that the patient, if competent, would have selected the
course chosen by the surrogate, and proof that the state's interests are not paramount,
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lowing question to the state supreme court as having great public
importance:
Whether the guardian of a patient who is incompetent but not in a
permanent vegetative state and who suffers from an incurable, but
not terminal condition, may exercise the patient's right of self-de-
termination to forego sustenance provided artificially by a nasogas-
tric tube? 311
The court answered affirmatively with qualification. In this, only
the second self-determination case to expressly construe article I, sec-
tion 23,12 the justices began with a broadly-stated premise-"everyone
has a fundamental right to the sole control of his or her person.'- 3 An
"integral component" of self-determination is the inherent right to
make personal medical treatment decisions, which necessarily encom-
passes "all medical choices. 3 14 Competent persons have the right to
refuse medical intervention, 315 regardless of the denomination of the
procedure at issue,3 16 and regardless of the subjectivity of the choice.
Indeed, mainstream judicial thought has often honored the subjec-
tive medical decisions of patients. For instance, courts have enforced
the wishes of competent adults to forego medical intervention when
id. at 271-73; the requirement that the surrogate support a decision to forego treatment
by clear and convincing evidence, id. at 273; and the scope of judicial review, when
required, id. at 273-74.
311. Id. at 274.
312. Only In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989), clearly decided a self-deter-
mination claim under article I, section 23. That decision struck down Florida's parental
consent law because it impermissibly interfered with the right of an unmarried, fifteen-
year-old pregnant female to decide for herself whether to terminate her pregnancy dur-
ing the first trimester. It bears repeating, however, that the court's privacy cases that
construed common law and the federal constitution may strongly suggest principles
incorporated into article I, section 23.
313. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
314. Id. (emphasis added).
315. Id. (citing Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); Cruzan
ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990)). Cf. id.
at 2851-52 (regarding the right of a competent person to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, including lifesaving hydration and nutrition, as a liberty interest that derives
from the fourteenth amendment).
316. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 11 n.6 (regarding as legally indistinguishable, med-
ical procedure denominated as "major or minor, ordinary or extraordinary, life-pro-
longing, life-maintaining, life-sustaining, or otherwise").
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premised on tenets of religious faith,3 17 on the desire to avoid a dimin-
ished quality of life,318 and on the refusal to endure prolonged and in-
sufferable pain.31 9 Notably, the court has yet to insist that a claimant
first demonstrate an objective manifestation of reasonableness as a pre-
condition to the threshold finding that personal medical choice deserves
protection. 20
The inviolability of the personal right to decide a medical course
does not turn on whether the person is competent or incompetent. The
317. See, e.g.. Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (compe-
tent adult, who is also a practicing Jehovah's Witness, has a lawful right to refuse a
blood transfusion, without which she may well die).
318. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1142, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 304 (Ct. App. 1986) (patient in a public hospital, whose life has been di-
minished to the point of "hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration," has
the right to forego life-support); Drabick v. Drabick, 200 Cal. App 3d 185, 196, 245
Cal. Rptr. 840, 846 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its
detriments is a decision that engages on personal and medical values, including ideas
about the quality of life. It is not a decision that courts are constituted or especially
well-qualified to make."); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417,
434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (1986) (recognizing a right "to avoid circumstances in which
the individual himself would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade his
humanity") (citation omitted); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955 (Me. 1987) ("Gard-
ner has himself done the balancing of his own values and their bearing on the question
of whether to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative state by artificial means. That
personal weighing of values is the essence of self-determination . . . . [W]e judges do
not ourselves engage in an independent assessment of the value of his life."); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. 1984) (a terminally ill patient might choose to
avoid "'[t]he ultimate horror . . . of being maintained in limbo, in a sterile room, by
machines controlled by strangers' ") (ditation omitted); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 26,
355 A.2d 647, 663 ("We have no hesitancy in deciding . . . that no external compel-
ling interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vege-
tate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any sem-
blance of cognitive or sapient life"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Cf. Cruzan, 110
S. Ct. at 2853 (states may decline to make judgments about a particular person's
"quality" of life, and simply assert "an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life").
319. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (terminally ill adult, who testified at bedside hearing to being "miserable" with
use of a respirator, has a right to remove it, even though death would follow within one
hour), approved, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash.
2d 545, 555, 747 P.2d 445, 450-51 (1987) (en banc) (the amount of pain endured by a
terminally ill, noncomatose person is a significant factor, although not the only factor,
to be considered in deciding whether to withhold life sustaining treatment).
320. In contrast, the court has imposed an objectivity requirement in disclosural
privacy cases, and cases decided in traditional search and seizure contexts.
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justices agreed that there was no constitutional basis for distinguishing
the protections inuring to competent persons, and those whose non-cog-
nitive condition prevented the personal exercise of their choice.321
Having decided that competent and incompetent persons alike en-
joy a constitutional right to make decisions involving their personal
medical care, the justices addressed three remaining questions-who
may exercise the right for an incompetent person, under what circum-
stances may the state regulate this area, and what procedures give
force to the right. Concerning the first question, precedent established
that a close family member, or a court-appointed guardian, may exer-
cise the right for an irreversibly comatose patient, whose essentially
vegetative existence was sustained by a mechanical respirator. 22
Browning extended the class of persons capable of exercising the pa-
tient's right to include proxies,3 23 and surrogates, such as close family
members and friends. 324 The role of those decision makers is a narrow
one:
We emphasize and caution that when the patient has left instruc-
tions regarding life-sustaining treatment, the surrogate must make
the medical choice that the patient, if competent, would have
made, and not one that the surrogate might make for himself or
321. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12 (citing John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc.
v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984)).
322. Id. at 13 (citing Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926).
323. Persons to whom the patient delegated full responsibility for future medical
decision making. Id. at 15.
324. Id. (footnote omitted). Browning is a logical and warranted extension of
Bludworth. It makes little sense to limit the class of surrogate decision makers in this
context to court-appointed guardians and "close" family members. Friends, for in-
stance, may be well-suited to exercise the patient's charted medical ccurse. Moreover,
the patient may prefer to designate a friend, rather than a family member, or there
may be no family that could be said to be "close," whether by consanguinity or famili-
arity. Indeed, delegations of friends by patients are commonplace. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct.
at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The durable family power of attorney is another device used in this setting. The
legislature authorizes a principle to create a durable family power of attorney by
designating his or her "spouse, brother, sister, niece, nephew, or a person related to the
principal by lineal consanguinity" FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1) (Supp. 1990). But see Wa-
ters, Florida Durable Power of Attorney Law: The Need For Reform, 17 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 519 (1990). Mr. Waters argues that the durable power as presently enacted "af-
fords only a limited and frequently unhelpful alternative to guardianship," id at 521,
by illogically restricting the class of attorneys-in-fact to a narrow group of relatives,
and failing to provide procedural safeguards for exercise of the power. Id. at 546.
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herself, or that the surrogate might think is in the patient's best
interests .3
25
Regarding the second question, the state must first show a compel-
ling state interest before it regulates the exercise of personal medical
care choices protected under article I, section 23. Often repeated as the
state's interests in cases involving a person's refusal of unwanted medi-
cal treatment are a non-exclusive list of factors that include preserving
life, protecting innocent third parties, preventing suicide, and helping to
maintain the ethical integrity of the medical profession.126
Browning makes a significant contribution to state constitutional
doctrine by recognizing that among the state's interests is its overarch-
ing responsibility to safeguard the inalienable rights of its citizens. The
court wrote with great clarity that "[t]he state has a duty to assure
that a person's wishes regarding medical treatment are respected. '327
Continuing, it said that: "obligation serves to protect the rights of the
individual from intrusion by the state unless the state has a compelling
interest great enough to override this constitutional right.3 28 On bal-
ance, the state's interests failed to outweigh Mrs. Browning's right to
self-determine her medical course.3 29 Moreover, there is no state inter-
325. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13. The opinion does not suggest the parameters of
the constitutional right of privacy when the patient left no instructions regarding future
medical care.
326. Courts have recognized other state interests in this context. See Browning,
568 So. 2d at 14 n.13 (protecting incompetents from erroneous decisions, avoiding un-
wanted medical care, and assuring that the person's wishes are faithfully executed);
Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the state's
interest in maintaining a home with two parents for two minor children is insufficient to
override one parent's choice to forego lifesaving blood transfusion on religious and pri-
vacy grounds); Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853 (states are entitled to guard against poten-
tial abuse, and to establish procedures that guarantee accurate fact-finding).
327. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13 (emphasis added). The notion that the state has
a duty to secure the inalienable rights of all persons was a truth self-evident to the
signers on the nation's Declaration of Independence. The court noted Justice Stevens's
recent observation of the principle in the context of the federal constitution: "'Our
Constitution is born of the proposition that all legitimate governments must secure the
equal right of every person to 'Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.'" Id. at 13
n.12 (quoting Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2878-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting Declaration of Independence). Browning makes a novel addition to the
court's constitutional jurisprudence by declaring that the Florida Constitution em-
braces those same ideals.
328. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13-14.
329. Id. at 14. Because the state failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest
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est that overrides the interest of the state in protecting its people.
Finally, the court addressed the procedures designed to protect the
patient's chosen medical course. The court declared that the decision
maker need not obtain prior judicial approval to carry out the wishes of
the patient, provided the patient specifically expressed those wishes
orally or in writing in the event of later incapacity. 330 If a patient dele-
gates decision making power to a proxy, the designation must be in
writing. Because the proxy by nature has full decision making responsi-
bility, the patient need not express any instructions. However, when a
patient provides instructions, the patient need not designate a decision
maker. In that event, a close family member or friend may carry out
the patient's wishes, and a designation, if made, may be oral or
written.33'
Browning charges the decision maker with two responsibilities.
First, the decision maker must take "great care" in exercising a pa-
tient's medical choice.33 2 Second, the decision maker must support a
decision with clear and convincing evidence. 3  If the particular deci-
sion is to forego medical treatment of an incompetent patient, the deci-
sion maker must satisfy three conditions by clear and convincing
evidence:
1. . . . that the patient executed any document knowingly, will-
ingly, and without undue influence, and that the evidence of the
patient's oral declarations is reliable;
2.. . . that the patient does not have a reasonable probability of
recovering competency so that the right could be exercised directly
by the patient; and
that would justify its regulation of a person's decision to forego life-sustaining medical
intervention, there was no need to consider whether the means to carry out the state's
interest was "narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible." Id.
330. Id. at 15. This was not the first time the court opted for a nonjudicial proce-
dure that facilitated an individual's choice. See John F. Kennedy Hosp., Inc. v. Blud-
worth, 452 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla. 1984) (rejecting the need to obtain prior court ap-
proval as "too burdensome" under the circumstances).
331. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
332. Id. The requirement of "great care" does not insist upon bright lines. The
case sheds no light on what facts might satisfy the requirement, and its true meaning
remains to be charted by future cases. Its usage, however, suggests that it is a standard
entirely independent of the second requirement imposed upon the decision maker.
333. Id. Accord Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 (holding that the United States Con-
stitution does not forbid a state from requiring clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent's wishes to withdraw treatment).
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3. . . . that any limitations or. conditions expressed either orally or
in the written declaration have been carefully considered and
satisfied." 4 .
The third condition does not apply to proxies, nor does the provision for
oral declarations contained in the first condition. 335
Trial courts are available to proxies or surrogates who seek a dec-
laration of their powers, and to interested parties who challenge the
decision of a proxy or surrogate. If questioned or challenged in court, a
written declaration or designation of proxy, in the absence of contrary
evidence of intent, establishes a rebuttable presumption that constitutes
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes. The decision
maker may rely upon physicians' certificates to establish a rebuttable
presumption that the medical condition described in the declaration has
been satisfied. 336 Oral statements by the patient to forego treatment, if
made while competent, are admissible on the issue of intent, but stand-
ing alone, are not presumptively clear and convincing. 33
Turning to the record facts, the court found that the conditions
Mrs. Browning established in her declaration were satisfied. There was
no question concerning the validity of the declaration, or that she suf-
fered from a terminal condition. Only the question of imminence re-
mained to be decided. Medical evidence established that death would
occur within four-to-nine days were the nasogastric tube removed.
Thus, there was clear and convincing evidence on the record that satis-
fied the condition of imminence, and the surrogate could confidently
instruct Mrs. Browning's health care providers to discontinue
334. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
335. Id. at 15-16.
336. The decision maker "must obtain, and may rely upon" certificates (affida-
vits, sworn statements, or depositions) from at least three physicians, including the pri-
mary treating physician and two others who are specialists. Id. at 16 (adhering to
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926).
337. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16. Justice Overton's objection to the majority
opinion was limited to its authorization of oral statements as proof of the patient's
intent. He argued that judicial involvement was "appropriate" to assure the validity of
the statements, and to avoid conflicts of interest between patient and surrogate, for
instance, when the surrogate stands to financially benefit from the premature termina-
tion of the patient's life support, Id. at 18 (Overton, J., concurring in part, and dissent-
ing in part.). The majority addressed these concerns by stating: "We cannot ignore the
possibility that a surrogate might act contrary to the wishes of the patient. Yet, we are
loath to impose a cumbersome legal proceeding at such a delicate time in those many
cases where the patient neither needs nor desires additional protection." Id. at 15.
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feeding.338
With unmistakable clarity, Browning advances the core concept
that article I, section 23 makes inviolable certain personal freedoms.
The case holds that persons have a constitutionally protected right to
make all personal medical decisions, without prior judicial approval,
and that they may freely delegate to others the power to make those
decisions on their behalf in the event of incapacity.339 If a person loses
competence after making a declaration that charts a future medical
course, the decision maker may exercise the medical choice that the
patient would have wanted, provided that the patient's intent is sup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence. Several features in the opinion
underscore the significance of that holding including: the unanimity of
the justices on the turning principles of the opinion; the repeated rejec-
tion of factors traditionally thought to justify state intervention into
this area; the recognition of a constitutional right not asserted by a
claimant, and previously undefined by the court's case law; and the sel-
dom-seen crafting of rules to safeguard the exercise of the constitu-
tional right.
Browning's importance extends beyond the four corners of the
opinion, for it signals that the Florida Constitution's right of privacy
may eclipse the privacy protections of the United States Constitution in
the area of self-determination. Only months before Browning, the
United States Supreme Court decided Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health,3 40 and acknowledged for the first
time that a person's choice to discontinue life-sustaining medical treat-
ment is a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. The
justices stood noticeably silent on the question logically presented by
the case, whether the choice deserved protection under the implied fed-
eral right to privacy. To some, it matters not whether the right of self-
determination derives from liberty, privacy, or some other fundamental
guarantee.34 1 Prudence cautions, however, that the textual basis of an
338. Id. at 17. A declaration that instructs the decision maker to remove life-
support in the event of "imminent" death, will be satisfied constitutionally by looking
to the length of time a patient will survive after removal of life-support, not to the
length of time the patient will survive if life-support measures are introduced, or
maintained.
339. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 17.
340. Id.
341. Indeed, Browning acknowledges that "privacy" encompasss.s a concept of
freedom that has been interchangeably used with the commonly understood notion of
"liberty," both of which imply a fundamental right of self-determination. Browning,
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asserted right cannot be lightly considered. 342 Cruzan's silence about
whether federal privacy protects the right to make personal medical
decisions leaves federal constitutional privacy law unsettled, and raises
the possibility that the Court no longer views privacy as a fundamental
right.3 3 Alternatively, the decision may signal that the Court has no
desire to nationalize privacy law in this context, and for the moment
leaves the states free to fashion federal privacy protections.
When read together, In re T.W.344 and Browning in one year's
time seemingly demonstrate a commitment of the court to hold that the
exercise of personal choice within the realm of self-determination ought
to remain largely unimpeded by state regulation. The release of Stall
one month after Browning, however, cast into doubt the court's true
resolve to vigorously defend expressions of personal freedom classified
under that rubric. Review of Stall follows.
The state charged Stall and others with violating Florida's RICO
act,345 and the predicate offenses under the obscenity statute, 46 for al-
legedly showing, selling, distributing, or renting obscene material. The
trial court dismissed the information, finding in part that the obscenity
statute violated article I, section 23. On appeal to the district court,
Stall maintained that he had standing to vicariously assert the privacy
rights of his customers. Relying upon Stanley v. Georgia,41 which de-
clared that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibited states from
568 So. 2d at 9-10; see also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(the notion of liberty is "inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and
self-determination").
342. Pegging an asserted interest to a particular constitutional text offers a de-
gree of analytical certainty. For one, the textual basis of a right may indicate its rela-
tive strength. Some sections afford a greater standard of protection than other sections.
Compare FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (measuring state infringement of the express right of
privacy according to the compelling state interest test) with FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12
(measuring state infringement of privacy right by standards of reasonableness and le-
gitimacy). For another, rights expressly conferred, rather than implied, provide the
clearest evidence of their existence and importance. See Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting).
343. Allen, Court Disables Disputed Legacy of Privacy Right, Supreme Court
Review, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at 8 (criticizing Cruzan for its failure to endorse
the privacy analyses it acknowledged).
344. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
345. Florida RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) Act, FLA.
STAT. §§ 895.01-.06 (1985).
346. FLA. STAT. §§ 847.011 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
347. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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proscribing the mere possession of obscene material,348 Stall argued
that the right to possess would be meaningless unless sellers and dis-
tributors of obscene material were similarly able to seek protection
from governmental intrusion.
Citing two federal decisions, Griswold v. Connecticut4"1 and Eisen-
stadt v. Baird,3 50 the district court panel expressly found that Stall was
entitled to assert the privacy right of his customers to possess obscene
material.351 It reasoned that Stall's customers had no effective means of
protecting their right of possession in a prosecution for distribution, un-
less Stall had standing to raise the claim on their behalf.
On review, a majority of five justices found the two federal cases
easily distinguishable. Griswold rested on different facts. The State of
Connecticut prosecuted as accessories the executive director of the
state planned parenthood league, and a licensed physician because they
prescribed contraceptives to married persons in violation of a statute
that forbade the use of contraceptives. Ultimately, the Griswold de-
fendants were allowed to champion the fundamental right of marital
privacy held by the patients with whom they had a professional rela-
tionship. Otherwise, their patients' right would have had no voice
against the infringement occasioned by Connecticut's contraceptive
ban. The majority in Stall relied upon Paris Adult Theater I v. Sla-
ton,3152 where the United States Supreme Court had disapproved the
348. In Stanley, state and federal officers gained entry into Stanley's home upon
the strength of a search warrant, which entitled them to seize illegal bookmaking
equipment, records, and materials. While looking through a desk drawer in an upstairs
bedroom, they discovered three eight-millimeter reels of film. After viewing the films
on a projector, the officers determined that the films were obscene and seized them.
The state prosecuted Stanley under a Georgia obscenity law, which among other
things, proscribed the "possession . . . of obscene matter," id. at 558 n. ', and obtained
a conviction. The Court overturned that conviction with its familiar holding:
[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private
possession of obscene material a crime .... [T]he States retain broad
power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.
Id. at 568 (footnote omitted).
349. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
350. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
351. State v. Long, 544 So. 2d 219, 221-22 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), ap-
proved sub nom. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990). Ultimately, the district
court held that article I, section 23 did not shield Stall from criminal prosecution under
the obscenity statute, id. at 222, and that the statute did not impermissibly interfere
with the constitutional right of privacy. Id. at 223.
352. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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analogy by saying that "'it is unavailing to compare a theater, open to
the public for a fee, with the private home of Stanley v. Georgia, and
the marital bedroom of Griswold v. Connecticut.' 353
Eisenstadt was also unavailing. There, the defendant who distrib-
uted vaginal foam to an unmarried adult woman in violation of Massa-
chusetts law was entitled to assert the rights of unmarried persons who
were denied access to contraceptives under that law. The majority dis-
tinguished Eisenstadt upon the stated basis that it clearly was premised
on the statute's unequal treatment of married and unmarried persons in
violation of the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The
two cases were easily contrasted:
There is no such distinction between adults who may have access to
obscene materials. Moreover, private users and commercial sellers
are separate and distinct classes and may be treated differently.
Eisenstadt provides a vehicle, as do other cases, to raise the consti-
tutionality of a statute by holding that persons or entities in differ-
ent positions have the same rights and must be treated the same. It
certainly does not sustain the rationale that, because one has a
right to view obscene material in one's home, statutes forbidding
the sale and commercial distribution of such material are
invalid.354
Stall's Stanley argument was equally unpersuasive to the majority
because the United States Supreme Court has consistently limited
Stanley to its facts. In particular, United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels
of Super 8mm. Film355 directly stated: "'[T]he protected right to pos-
sess obscene material in the privacy of one's home does not give rise to
a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others.' "9356
Having distinguished Griswold and Eisenstadt, and limited Stan-
ley to its facts, the majority implicitly rejected the district court's find-
353. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 65).
354. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 262-63. A fiery dissent charged that the majority
grossly misrepresented federal law by concluding that Eisenstadt is simply an equal
protection case, thus implying that no privacy concerns were implicated. "[T]he hold-
ing of Eisenstadt is unintelligible unless it is premised upon a privacy right involved in
the purchase and sale of contraceptives." Id. at 273 (Kogan, J., dissenting; Barkett, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted). Also, Eisenstadt clearly relied on Griswold, which ad-
dressed the right of privacy in the marital relationship. Id. at 273 n.21.
355. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
356. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260 (quoting United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of
Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973)).
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ing that Stall had standing to assert the constitutionally protected right
of privacy enjoyed by his customers. 357 Gratuitously, the majority
added that the privacy amendment does not apply to vendors of obscen-
ity either. 58 Normally, a claimant's failure to assert successfully a pro-
tected interest disposes the issue. Once Stall failed to meet that thresh-
old, he could advance no constitutional privacy claim, and the inquiry
into the merits was unnecessary. Perhaps it was to more fully establish
its position on obscenity regulation that the majority continued.
The five-member majority reached the merits of Stall's privacy
claim by engaging in the following hypothetical: "Assuming that [those
who show, sell, distribute, or rent allegedly obscene material] have vi-
carious standing to raise their customers' privacy interest, we agree
with the district court that their customers' right of privacy does not
extend to [them] . ' 3 9
As a threshold matter, the right of privacy in the context of ob-
scenity regulations attaches only when a claimant demonstrates a "rea-
sonable" expectation of privacy.360 Borrowing from Paris Adult Thea-
ter 1,36' the majority wrote: "'The idea of a 'privacy' right and a place
357. The majority's disagreement with the district court on the standing issue
may explain why the majority approved the decision of the district court, see Stall, 570
So. 2d at 258, 262, and did not approve the opinion.
358. Id. (relying upon 12 200-Foot Reels, 413 U.S. at 128). The only question
posed by Stall asks whether the right of the vendor's customers to privately possess
obscene material extends to the point of sale, and if so, whether the vendor can take
advantage of that protection in a criminal prosecution for unlawful distribution.
Whether Stall himself, as a distributor, has a personal privacy interest i:s a concern not
directly presented by the case as framed by the four corners of the opinion.
359. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 258 (citation omitted).
360. The reasonableness of one's expectation of privacy takes into account all the
circumstances, and in particular, the objective manifestations of that expectation. Id. at
260 (citations omitted). Requiring a claimant to show objective reasonableness is a
standard that is characteristic of disclosural privacy, and search and seizure cases.
Before Stall, the court had not yet imposed that requirement on matters of personal
choice grouped under the rubric of self-determination.
361. Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 49. That opinion involved the civil pros-
ecution of two Atlanta movie theaters, together with their owners and managers, under
the Georgia Code, for the exhibition of allegedly obscene films to the public for paid
admission. The Court reaffirmed the principle that obscene material enjoys no first
amendment protection, and held: "[T]he States have a legitimate interest in regulating
commerce in obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene material in
places of public accommodation, including so-called 'adult' theaters from which minors
are excluded." Id. at 69.
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of public accommodation are, in this context, mutually exclusive.' "362
The justices summarily declared that a customer has no "legitimate
reasonable" expectation of privacy to patronize a retail establishment
in order to purchase obscene material.36 3 Stall is the first instance
where the court declined to find even the bare existence of an asserted
privacy interest under article I, section 23.364
The majority declared that the state has a "legitimate interest 'in
stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity.' "1365 To accomplish
that aim, the state is empowered to make "'morally neutral'" judg-
ments that commercialized obscenity injures the community as a
whole.366 Unless those choices "'clearly transgress private rights,' ",367
362. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 66-
67).
363. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 257. The majority implied in dicta that Stall could not
succeed on his claim because he failed to present persons whose constitutionally pro-
tected right to possess obscene material was affected by the state action. Id. However,
the court had already concluded that there exists no constitutionally protected right to
purchase such material. Thus, it would be futile for Stall to produce persons who were
entitled to privately possess that material. That dicta raises speculation whether the
court would have been less reticent to seriously explore the limits of article I, section
23, were the right asserted by such individuals personally. Stall's close link to the com-
mercial enterprise, which was the focus of the legislative policy, made him an unlikely
candidate to champion the right vicariously in a case of first impression.
364. In a few pre-article I, section 23 cases, the court was unwilling to find an
implied right of privacy in the Florida Constitution. See, e.g., Shevin v. Byron, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 639 (Fla. 1980); In re Post-Newsweek
Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 779 (Fla. 1979); Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962,
965 (Fla. 1977).
365. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260 (quoting Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 57)
(emphasis added). Federal constitutional analysis accepts as the state's interests in this
context, "the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community devel-
opment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety
itself." Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 58.
366. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 69).
Unwilling to accept the notion that obscene materials are inherently harmful, the dis-
sent looked to the record for evidence that would show actual injury to one or more
persons. Having found "no shred of evidence" to support the state's regulation, Justice
Kogan wrote, "I do not believe that abstract, unproven harm is a sufficient reason to
invade the right to be let alone." Id. at 270. He would hold that the article I, section 2
prohibits governmental intrusion into the noninjurious aspects of one's personal life,
including the acquisition of "noninjurious reading materials and entertainment for dis-
crete personal use." Id. at 269. Accord Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla.
1989) (construing privacy in the context of article I, section 12, the court's majority
wrote that the "right of personal autonomy or privacy. . . is forfeited when an individ-
ual acts to harm another").
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it is the role of the judicial branch to defer to a coordinate branch.
There is no breach of private rights when the state regulates obscene
works that "'depict or describe sexual conduct.' ",368
The anti-obscenity statute at issue proscribes the distribution and
exhibition of" 'obscene'" material, as well as "'lewd, lascivious, filthy,
indecent, sadistic, or masochistic' material. 3 6' The majority reasoned
that those statutes are "sufficiently limited, both by their terms and by
common sense"3 0 to pass constitutional scrutiny. Conceding that the
terms have different shades of meaning, the majority accepted that the
federal analogue to Florida's obscenity statute, which uses the identical
terms, "'has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing por-
trayals of sex.' "1371
That analysis provoked Justice Kogan and Justice Barkett to
charge that the majority's mode of statutory interpretation was "legally
indefensible." The fundamental legal obstacle posed by the anti-ob-
scenity law, they argued, is that the term "obscenity" itself defies a
legally comprehensible definition. Consequently, a handful of people
"define" the crime after-the-fact, and thereby impose their personal
views of morality on others.3 72 Such unbridled censorship impermissibly
restricts individual autonomy, and offends the very spirit of the privacy
amendment.37 3
The majority also reasoned that the weight of state court prece-
367. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1204 (Grimes,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
368. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 259 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973)). Miller set standards for state regulation of obscenity, which were incorporated
in Florida law. See FLA. STAT. § 847.001(7), (11) (Supp. 1986).
369. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 259 (citations omitted).
370. Id.
371. Id. (quoting Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1962)
(footnotes omitted)). But cf. Warren v. State, 572 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1991) (striking on
vagueness grounds a statute that proscribes the keeping of house of "ill fame:" even
though "the general population might have understood the meaning of 'ill fame' a cen-
tury ago, the lack of definition in the statutes, jury instruction, and cases is fatal to its
continued validity") (unanimous on point); Hicks v. State, 572 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1991)
(following Warren) (unanimous); Palmieri v. State, 572 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1991) (fol-
lowing Warren) (unanimous).
372. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 263 (Barkett, J., dissenting; Kogan, J., concurring.); id.
at 263 (Kogan, J., dissenting; Barkett, J., concurring). History records; with irony the
numerous, short-lived attempts by the censorship police to suppress literary works, now
regarded as masterpieces. Don Juan, An American Tragedy, Lady Chatterly's Lover,
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dent opposes Stall. It claimed that the court had several years ago "ad-
dressed" Stall's Stanley claim in State v. Kraham,3 4 which specifically
rejected the argument that it was illogical and arbitrary to sanction one
person for providing material to another who was entitled to possess
that material. 375
To say that the court had before "addressed" the issue now raised
by Stall is imprecise. Kraham considered whether the 1975 version of
the obscenity statute, which proscribed the sale of obscene material,
was unconstitutional in light of one's right to possess such material
under Stanley. However, the voters approved article I, section 23 in
November 1980, over two years after Kraham. Thus, the court never
even considered whether a person could vicariously assert the protec-
tions of the state privacy amendment. This criticism of the majority's
opinion is all the more valid in light of its repeated reliance in earlier
privacy cases upon the teachings of Winfield v. Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering,37 6 which firmly established Florida's general privacy
right as affording greater protections than those implied in the federal
Bill of Rights.
Finally, Stall makes an intriguing contribution to the principles of
constitutional construction. Said the majority:
There is no indication that the drafters of article I, section 23
meant to broaden the right of privacy [beyond then-existing state
or federal protections] as it relates to obscene materials or that the
validity of [the anti-obscenity statute] is affected by the privacy
provision. Indeed, had the public been aware of such an applica-
tion, we seriously doubt that the amendment would have been
adopted.3 77
But this is not a case where the court must divine the adopters' intent.
Unlike many personal rights with ancient origins and no recorded his-
torical materials to aid constitutional interpretation, Florida's right of
privacy is a recent addition to the organic law, with much available
material to its credit. The majority's use of unwarranted, unsupported
374. 360 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 941 (1979).
375. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 258.
376. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985); see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191; Public
Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 102 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring spe-
cially); Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 671, 740 (1978).
377. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 262 (footnote omitted).
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speculation implicitly discredits precedent. First, past privacy cases
were guided by the knowledge that the adopters intended to assure a
level of protection beyond the level afforded by federal law. Second,
there can be no doubt that Florida's privacy amendment imported state
and federal cases in existence at the time of its adoption.3 78 Among
them are several cases that recognized the right of persons to possess
obscene materials in their homes.3 79 These cases are necessarily woven
into the state constitutional fabric.
Third, Stall is out of sync with the court's two most recent article
I, section 23 cases, Browning and In re T.W. Unlike Stall, both cases
addressed the constitutional claims head-on, and broke new ground by
extending constitutional horizons beyond the perimeter of precedent.
And unlike Stall, neither case speculated about the adopters' intent.
No doubt the court could have avoided reaching the heart of those
claims by engaging in the selfsame speculation: "had the public been
aware" that the amendment would one day be interpreted to protect
the decision of a person to terminate his or her life by refusing medical
intervention,38 0 or to protect the decision of a minor female to termi-
nate her pregnancy without her parents' consent,38' "we seriously doubt
that the amendment would have been adopted."3 2
But it did not. Instead, Browning began boldly with the premise
that "everyone has a fundamental right to the sole control of his or her
person." 8 ' And In re T.W. observed initially that "'[t]he citizens of
Florida opted for more protection from governmental intrusion when
they approved article I, section 23'" than that required by federal
law.384 Only one year before the court released Stall, Chief Justice
Ehrlich acknowledged the central importance of precedent in constru-
378. Id. at 264 (citing Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980); see
also Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 127 (Fla. 1970) (adopting cases that
construed predecessor version of article I, section 4).
379. Id. (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 557; State v. Keaton, 371 So. 2d 86 (Fla.
1979)).
380. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 4.
381. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1186.
382. Indeed, the court could have avoided a substantial portion of the political
controversy spurred by In re T. W. had it declined to face the issue head-on. See Ander-
son, Judicial Politics, 77 A.B.A. J. 34 (Jan. 1991) (reporting that this case threatened
the very composition of the court by "caus[ing] such a ruckus among abortion-rights
opponents" as to cast into doubt the outcome of the retention campaigr of the opinion's
author).
383. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
384. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191-92 (quoting Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548).
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ing article I, section 23-the certain knowledge that Floridians chose a
greater degree of privacy than provided under federal law "alone could
justify broadening the scope of [precedent]. '' 385 Rather than engage in
unsupported speculation about what the adopters might have intended,
the majority should have ascertained the adopters' intent in light of
historically known fact and relevant precedent. 86
Stall is a decisional oddity that leaves much to ponder. One might
argue that the majority actually decided Stall by applying the doctrine
of standing. Clearly, the court concluded that Stall could not vicari-
ously assert the privacy rights of his customers. Under that interpreta-
tion, the majority had no need to reach the merits of the underlying
privacy claim. However, much of the majority opinion addresses the
very nature of the substantive right of privacy, and indeed declares that
Stall failed to satisfy the threshold for asserting a privacy right. Conse-
quently, one might alternatively argue that the majority effectively
mooted the standing issue, rendering its discussion of the standing doc-
trine mere dicta, and reached the merits. In the final analysis, the
standing theory advances the narrower of the two alternative holdings
and therefore presents the stronger argument.
Several factors argue that Stall is an aberrational distortion on the
landscape of article I, section 23. Among them are its lack of analytical
clarity, disregard of constitutionally relevant precedent, and casting
upon the claimant a requirement of objectivity when the court in nu-
merous other instances has honored purely subjective wishes of persons
to self-determine matters of personal choice. These factors caution that
the decision lacks precedential importance outside the circumstances
presented.
385. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 102 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially) (emphasis
added).
386. Compare Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64
(Fla. 1990). In Shriners Hospitals, released only four months before Stall, a four-
member majority struck down the centuries-old mortmain statute as the result of a
''common sense reading of the plain and ordinary meaning" of the text of article I,
section 2. Id. at 67. It is beyond dispute that a like reading of the personal "right to be
let alone," especially when taken together with extant privacy case law, would have
amply supported the conclusion that, as a threshold matter, article I, section 23 em-
braced a person's right to procure or view obscene material, free from state interfer-
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C. CONCLUSION
The single most noteworthy conclusion to be drawn from the
court's state constitutional jurisprudence of 1990 is that the court has
accepted major responsibility for protecting personal rights from gov-
ernmental excess. The court convincingly asserted its role as guardian
of article I rights when it twice reached outside the record pleadings,
and imposed a constitutional remedy to achieve a just result.8 " In mat-
ters of personal medical health care choices, a decisive majority of the
membership showed its commitment to reshaping the constitutional
landscape by pushing the frontiers of protection beyond the perimeter
of precedent. Moreover, the majority added a component to compelling
state interest analysis by declaring that the state has an overarching
responsibility to safeguard the inalienable rights of its citizens.388
On three occasions, the court also assumed a role for "the judiciary
that deferred to the policy choices and functions of coordinate branches
of government. A majority declined to interfere with the legislature's
efforts to regulate commercialized obscenity without any record evi-
dence that justified the state's action;38 9 accepted the legislature's ex-
clusive procedures to compensate owners whose property the state de-
stroyed in a citrus canker eradication program, as a "reasonable
alternative" to the time-honored common law remedy of inverse con-
demnation;390 and presumed that the Department of Corrections prop-
erly performed its function of executing condemned prisoners in the
face of macabre evidence of a malfunctioning electric chair. 39'
The opinions teach that the selection of a particular principle of
constitutional interpretation greatly influences the court's constitutional
logic. Although it is impossible to predict with precision which princi-
ple the justices will rely upon in any given case, two cases this year
deserve particular attention, because they illustrate the importance of
principle selection on the outcome. 392
387. See supra notes 116 and 308 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
392. In any analytical scheme, the point of departure is of vital importance. As
Justice Frankfurter noted years ago: in law, as in history, "the place you reach depends
upon the direction you are taking[, and] where one comes out on a case depends on
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Courts often glean the meaning of constitutional text from the
original intent of the adopters, and there are a variety of theories used
to ascertain that intent. One theory proved to be critical to the analysis
of Shriners Hospitals,39 3 where a clear majority of four justices made a
"common sense reading of the plain and ordinary meaning" of the text
of article I, section 2. It decided that the adopters must have intended
that the ability to transmit property to others is included within the
grasp of that section's right "to acquire, possess and protect property,"
and then tossed out Florida's mortmain statute because it allowed cer-
tain persons to avoid charitable devises.
Another theory of construction emerged in Stall,94 where a five-
member majority relied upon an intriguing, common sense-like inter-
pretation of article I, section 23 to reject a claim that argued essen-
tially, because the section entitles persons to possess obscene materials
privately, free from state regulation, then it must necessarily entitle
persons to acquire such materials. Said the court: "[H]ad the public
been aware of such an applicatioh, we seriously doubt that the amend-
ment would have been adopted." Stall, unlike Shriners Hospitals,
never considered the black letter text of article I, section 23. It never
asked whether the express textual protection afforded to the "right to
be let alone" entitled persons to acquire such materials for private use.
Had the majority applied Shriners Hospitals, it very likely would have
begun with the analytical premise that the text raises the potential of
such an entitlement, rather than reject the claim at the outset by the
unwarranted use of unsupported speculation.
Shriners Hospitals is instructive for its use of another approach to
constitutional interpretation, one unconcerned with original intent of
the adopters. The majority struck down the centuries-old mortmain
statute because its feudal rationale had no constitutional relevance in
"the context of our times." Shriners Hospitals aptly supports the prin-
ciples that the constitution must be viewed as a dynamic, "living" doc-
ument, and that courts must interpret the state's organic law free of
anachronistic strain upon its order.
The court's state constitutional labors concentrate on the personal
rights created in article I. In all, the court framed 102 state constitu-
tional issues in 80 cases. Of those, 73 issues and 62 cases directly per-
tained to article I. The decade survey of the 1980s identified five in-
stances where a state constitutional right eclipsed the corresponding
393. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
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federal right .3 5 Already this decade, two cases, Browning"' and Co-
hen, 97 clearly illustrate circumstances where the state constitution pro-
vides a degree of protection of personal rights greater than the federal
constitutional minimum.
395. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 857-58.
396. See supra notes 297-344 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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